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CULPABILITY AND CONTROL
STEPHEN J. MORSEt
"I couldn't help myself"; "I had no choice"; "I couldn't control
myself"; "I was forced to do it." All are common explanations used
to support the claim that an agent is not morally or criminally
responsible for otherwise culpable conduct. The most common
criminal law "control" excuses that instantiate these claims are
duress' and the so-called "volitional" tests for legal insanity.2 More
rarely, the agent uses such allegations to attack the prima facie case,
claiming that action was lacking.' Although, properly speaking, the
negation of the voluntary act requirement does not raise an excuse,
in such cases we also say that the agent was nonculpably out of
control. Finally, these explanations are sometimes synonymous with
the general conclusion that, for some reason, the agent is not
responsible. If it is true that an agent really could not help or
control herself and was not responsible for the loss of control,
blame and punishment are not justified on any theory of morality
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1 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged
to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or
a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another,
that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist.
Id.
2 See, e.g., id. § 4.01(1). Section 4.01(1) provides that "[a] person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity.., to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law." See also Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 859 (Ala. 1887) (establishing as a
criterion for the insanity defense an inability "to choose" between right and wrong).
s See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2). Section 2.01(2) states:
The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic sugges-
tion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.
Id.
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and criminal punishment. But what does it mean to say that an
agent could not control herself?
This Article attempts to clarify the meaning of and criteria for
"control excuses" and their relationship to cases of no action. I
shall use philosophy of mind and action, buttressed by findings
from the behavioral sciences, to clarify the meaning of excuse based
on lack of control. I begin in Part I with a brief homage to Michael
Moore, in which I claim that the explanation of human action is still
mysterious, despite the herculean efforts of the metaphysicians, but
that criminal law theory nevertheless must grapple with the theory
of action. Part II considers false starts: popular but inaccurate,
misleading, or confusing ways of defining control problems and
excuses. I show that these problems are not created by the truth of
determinism or universal causation, by the agent's lack of intention,
by defects of the will or volition, by irresistible impulses, or by the
agent's inability to exercise choice. The Article then turns in Part
III to a very brief account of how we humans manage to behave
ourselves in the face of ubiquitous antisocial desires. This part
provides a list of "self-protective devices" for the purpose of helping
to determine what the real problem is when an agent claims to be
"out of control."4 Part IV canvasses possible adequate justifications
for control excuses, arguing that most putative control or volitional
problems are best understood as rationality defects. In Part V, I
conclude by addressing the practical difficulties besetting the
assessment and adjudication of control cases.
I. METAPHYSICS, MYSTERY, AND METHODOLOGY:
HOMAGE TO MOORE
Human action, as opposed to mere movements of bodies in
space, has always perplexed philosophers and students of the
psyche. In overly simplified and polarized terms, some contend that
action is epiphenomenal, ultimately reducible to biophysical states
and events, whereas their opponents, including Michael Moore,5
claim that action is not so reducible and supervenes upon those very
states and events.6  Within the contending camps there are,
4 Throughout this Article, I use the term "out-of-control agent" to refer to any
person who claims that a control excuse was warranted on a particular occasion.
5 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 69-71 (1993).
6 On "supervenience" generally, seeJAEGWON KIM, Supervenience as a Philosophical
Concept, in SUPERVENIENCE AND MIND 131-60 (1993).
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predictably, numerous plausible variations. What is a non-philoso-
pher or even a philosopher to think? The best guess is that the
correct account of the metaphysics of action is a mystery still, and,
alas, shows no sign of being solved anytime soon.
Nevertheless, action theory cannot be avoided by criminal law
theorists: the criminal law presupposes precisely the folk psycholog-
ical account of human action based on desires, beliefs, intentions,
and other mental states that reductionist theories reject. It would
be possible, I suppose, for a crime control system to abandon
viewing individuals as moral agents who act for reasons and who
thereby may be blamed and praised, punished and rewarded, as
intrinsically appropriate responses to the moral qualities of their
conduct. Instead, the criminal law might treat persons as part of
the biophysical flotsam and jetsam of the universe and respond
solely on the basis of the type and degree of dangerousness people
threaten, without regard to moral responsibility.7 In such a world,
practices such as blame and punishment would have primarily
instrumental value, useful for controlling the harm-producing
behavior of homo sapiens, much like antibiotics are useful for
controlling the dangerous propensities of bacteria.' In the Anglo-
American world, however, virtually no criminal law theorist or
lawyer adheres to the purely consequentialist dystopia just
sketched.' Nearly all are either pure retributivists, like Moore,' 0
or mixed theorists for whom just deserts are a necessary, albeit not
sufficient, justification for criminal liability and punishment." In
7 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 285-86
(1968).8 See, e.g., DANIEL DENNETr, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH
WANTING 131-52 (1984).
9 But see BARBARA WoorON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF
A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 44-51 (2d ed. 1981) (defending the extension
of strict liability in the criminal law and relegating questions about mental states to
the dispositional phase of criminal proceedings).
" See Michael S. MooreJustifyingRetributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15 (1993); Michael
S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE
EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 208-17 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987) [hereinafter Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution]. But see David Dolinko, Three
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992) (arguing that retributive
justifications for punishment are theoretically untenable and facilitate injustice).
1 See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 148-52, 161-68
(1982) (describing the "limiting retributivist" as believing that "more subtle, finely
tuned moral distinctions of desert relevant to punishment can and should be made"
and using "utilitarian values" to do so). For an interesting thought experiment
suggesting that many mixed theorists are actually pure retributivists, see Moore, Moral
Worth of Retribution, supra note 10, at 184-85.
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either case, the necessity for just deserts presupposes a view of
persons as potentially morally responsible, that is, as rational,
uncompelled agents, rather than as merely bodies moving in space.
Given the criminal law's reliance on some theory of human
action, it would be utterly astonishing if the philosophy of action
and its implications did not clarify many of the central puzzles of
structure and doctrine. And as Act and Crime demonstrates, the
voluntary act doctrine, the actus reus requirement, and the criteria
for double jeopardy can be immensely enriched by just the sort of
abstract, conceptual analysis Michael Moore provides. I believe this
Article demonstrates that this is also true of control problems and
excuses. To reject the relevance of action theory, to fail to wrestle
with the mystery of action, is both implicitly to do it anyhow12 and
explicitly to abandon the quest for deeper understanding.
II. COMMON BUT FALSE STARTS, OR WHY I WISH PEOPLE
WOULD STOP TALKING CERTAIN WAYS
A. The Lure of Mechanism and Metaphor
Suppose you are sitting on a table with your legs dangling over
the edge. Assume that you are neurologically intact and that you
strongly prefer not to raise your legs because there is a good,
generalizable reason to remain still. Here are nine possible ways in
which your lower leg might nevertheless move upwards towards the
plane of the table: (1) Someone strikes your knee in the appropri-
ate place, producing the patellar reflex, and your leg jerks upwards;
(2) Someone vastly stronger than you pulls your leg up, despite your
valiant resistance efforts; (3) Someone threatens to kill you unless
you raise your leg; (4) Someone surreptitiously slips a powerful
hallucinogenic substance into the beverage you are sipping and you
hallucinate that a rabid dog is about to attack you, an attack you try
to ward off by kicking your leg at the hallucinated canine; (5)
Someone has given you the post-hypnotic suggestion that you
should raise your leg when the hypnotist snaps her fingers, and
when she does so, you raise your leg; (6) You have an unconscious
12 I am borrowing here from John Maynard Keynes's famous quote from his
General Theoy of Employment: "[piractical men, who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
from some academic scribbler of a few years back." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN
QUOTATIONS 120 (Tony Augarde ed., 1991).
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hatred of authority and when a superior enters the room, you kick
out as a sign of disrespect, believing falsely that this superior
deserves it; (7) An impulse to raise your leg arises and, without
thinking, you raise your leg; (8) You simply cannot understand
other-regarding reasons for not doing what you want to do when
you want to do it, and you now want to raise your leg, so you do; (9)
Finally, someone offers you something you want even more than not
to raise your leg if only you will raise it, so you do.
The first two cases are uncontroversially cases in which action
is lacking: in case one an irresistible neurological mechanism is at
work, and in case two an irresistible external force is literally
physically compelling the movement of your body, much like an
irresistible mechanism. Although something important was at stake
for raising your leg because there was good reason not to, no one
would either morally blame or punish you for the leg's movement.
After all, you did not raise it: there was no intention to raise the
leg, no physically voluntary act. These are easy cases forjust deserts
and consequential theorists. You truly could not help yourself in
either case and you would be excused. But these are not the cases
for which a control excuse is required. The lack of an act defeats
the prima facie case, whereas control excuses are meant to defeat
established prima facie liability.
Arguments by analogy are powerful and there appears to be an
almost irresistible impulse, based on what I term the "lure of mecha-
nism," to assimilate cases three through eight, and perhaps even the
ninth, to the first two. In all of them, it is undeniably colloquial
speech to claim, with varying degrees of success, that one cannot
help oneself, that one's act was "involuntary," in all of them. The
claimant thus hopes to borrow excusing force from the incontrovert-
ible cases of mechanism and literal physical compulsion, but it is
well to remember that all the other cases are not instances of
physical mechanism or compulsion. In all, there is intentional,
physically voluntary action.' Perhaps an excuse should obtain in
the others, but the meanings of "cannot help myself" and "involun-
tariness" are not literal, and the alluring metaphor of mechanism
should not obscure the difference. 4 If an excuse is to obtain in
" Cf. SANFORD H. KADISH, Excusing Crime, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW 81, 88 (1987) (arguing that an agent operating under duress acts
involuntarily in a "metaphorical" sense only).
" But see John Gardner, The Activity Condition in Criminal Law, in RECHT UND
MORAL 67 passim (Heike Jung et al. eds., 1991) (arguing that the analogy of
15911994]
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the latter seven cases, it must be one of excused action rather than
the absence of action and excuses for action must be separately and
not parasitically justified.
B. A Fundamental Psycholegal Error: Determinism/Universal
Causation as a Control Excuse
As Michael Moore 5 and 116 and countless others17 have rec-
ognized, the truth (or falsity) of determinism or universal causation
does not entail that all human action should (or should not) be
morally excused because all acts are nonculpably "out of control" in
the sense, raised variously in the nine cases, of mechanism, physical
compulsion, or, arguably, metaphorical compulsion. Most human
movement is not literally compelled and most acts are not done
under unusual constraints that might justify an excuse, such as to
avoid threats of death or serious bodily harm or in response to
hallucinations. Moreover, if determinism or universal causation
were (or were not) true and the basis for an excuse, then everyone
would (or would not be) excused for all action, an outcome
inconsistent with the arguments for a discrete control excuse.
Some try to avoid the inference from these observations that
determinism/universal causation is not the equivalent of compul-
sion by arguing for selective determinism."s The thesis is that only
some human action is determined and that only determined actions
are out of control. But this argument is based on wildly implausible
metaphysics. It is the theory of control that is doing the excusing
work, not determinism, and there is no reason to suppose that
determinism just happens to be on the job in just those cases we
pick out for excuse on moral grounds.
An argument closely related to selective determinism and
psychological to physical compulsion is virtually perfect, not metaphorical, and that
the psychologically compelled agent does not choose).
15 See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1128-48
(1985).
16 See Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in THE
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 35
(Gary B. Melton ed., 1985).
17 In recent decades, see, most notably, Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment,
in FREE WILL 59 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
"S See, e.g., Paul Hollander, Sociology, Selective Determinism, and the Rise of
Expectation, AM. SOCIOLOGIST, Nov. 1973, at 147, 148-49.
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equally implausible is based on an act's degree of causation. 9 The
more caused an act is, the more it allegedly is compelled. What
reason is there to believe, however, that degrees of causation are a
metaphysical feature of the universe, rather than a feature of our
current level of knowledge, and lack of it, about causation?
Presumably all phenomena of the universe are caused by the
sufficient variables that produce them, whatever may be the case
about our understanding of the causes. Just because we can explain
why Jane does what she does, but not whyJoan does what she does,
does not mean that Joan's behavior is less caused than Jane's.
Moreover, why is causation the equivalent of compulsion, even if it
is true that the universe metaphysically admits of degrees of
causation? Most action can be fully causally explained, at least by
using folk psychological accounts alloyed with ordinary notions of
proximate causation, but most action is not compelled in the sense
that leads to the conclusion that the agent was "out of control." For
example, each year when I politely ask my criminal law students
with brown hair to raise their hands to aid a classroom demonstra-
tion, all the brunettes do so. The unanimous hand-raising is not a
random event; it is fully caused by obvious variables, but there is not
a scintilla of lack of control among the students. They all deserve
my "thank you" for their admirably helpful, fully voluntary coopera-
tion.
20
Many claim, of course, that if determinism/universal causation
is true, then moral responsibility is unjustifiable make-believe that
cannot support punishment.2 ' Properly understood, however, this
is not the claim of control excuse advocates, because they do not
wish to excuse everybody. If correct, the more general argument
would obliterate individual moral responsibility, rather than
identifying a particular condition, such as lack of control, that
should excuse only those who meet its criteria. And even if true,
the reason to obliterate moral analysis is not because we are all
nonculpably out of control in the relevant sense. To excuse all on
that basis is precisely to smuggle back into the moral analysis that
which the general moral argument renders invalid.
'9 See MORRIS supra note 11, at 61-63; ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER 310 (1993).20 AsJohn Monahan pointed out in a personal communication, some students may
perceive that they really have "no choice," no matter how politely the request is put,
but as Parts I1 and IV.A demonstrate, such perceptions do not mean that the students
are out of control in any morally relevant sense.
21 See, e.g., RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE WILL passim (1991).
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Now, I and most others think the general argument is also
unpersuasive, but that dispute need not be rehearsed here. It is
sufficient to recognize, first, that determinism/universal causation
does not entail lack of control in the relevant sense, and, second,
that acceptance of the more general argument would require a
complete restructuring of our sense of ourselves as responsible
agents, our moral practices more generally, and, not least, our
system of criminal justice. Determinism or universal causation does
not provide a discrete basis for justifying control excuses.
C. Lack of Intention?
It is apparent that allegedly "uncontrolled" action is intentional,
even in the most extreme cases in which morality and law alike hold
that an excuse is fully justified. Remember, to begin, that we are
considering cases of action (cases three through nine), not bodily
movements resulting from irresistible mechanism or literal physical
compulsion (cases one and two). Consider cases of duress, in which
the agent is threatened with death unless she does the wrong
thing.2 2 The agent compelled to act by such threats clearly acts
intentionally, chooses to do the alternative rather than face
destruction. The agent's opportunity set is wrongfully and drastical-
ly limited in such conditions and we would surely excuse her, but
not because she lacked intent. It is perfectly appropriate to say that
she intended to save her life. For further support, the American
Psychiatric Association generically defines "compulsive behavior"-a
classic out-of-control case-as "intentional" and "purposeful."
23
I am assuming that under some conditions duress or coercion operates as an
excuse. Some contend that even if the balance of evils is negative, the agent's
conduct is justified if yielding to the threat is reasonable. See, e.g., R.JAY WALLACE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 185-
87, on file with author); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 166 (1987) (noting that the
success of a duress defense may only require that the harm threatened not be
significantly less).
11 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d ed. rev., 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]; see also
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 423 (4th ed., 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (outlining the specific
criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder and defining compulsions as conduct
"aimed at preventing or reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or
situation," which clearly implies that the conduct is purposive).
The American Psychiatric Association will publish DSM-IV in late May, 1994. I
am very grateful to Ms. Nancy Vettorello, M.U.P., Administrative Co-ordinator of
DSM-IV, who graciously provided me with advance copies of the DSM-IV materials
cited in this Article. Ms. Vettorello informed me that few ofthe diagnostic categories
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This analysis can be extended to all the hypothetical cases raised
above. The hallucinating agent is motivated by false perceptions
and beliefs, which limit her perceived opportunity set, but she acts
intentionally when she kicks out to fend off the hallucinated animal.
Even the purely impulsive person, who raises her leg for "no reason
at all," does so intentionally, albeit "thoughtlessly." And so on.
"Out-of-control" action is not necessarily unintentional action.
D. Will, Free Will, and Control
A standard claim about people who allegedly lack control is that
they do so because they suffer from some defect of the will or
volition, or because they lack free will. I shall address these claims
in order, beginning with a brief excursion into the concept of the
will.
Nonreductive theories of action uncontroversially posit that
people act for reasons that are rationalized by desire/belief sets.
Human action is based on practical reason. But it is notoriously
true that practical syllogisms are not deductive. A person may have
a desire/belief set that seemingly should ensue in a particular basic
action, but the person may not act at all. When the person does
act, how do desires, beliefs, and intentions lead to the bodily move-
ments that we call voluntary acts? This is the mystery that the
theory of the will or volition seeks to explain. In brief, an "opera-
tor" is necessary to get us from here-desires, beliefs, and inten-
tions-to there-a bodily movement that will successfully (we hope)
satisfy our desires.
Theories of the will or volition have waxed and waned in recent
philosophy. Under the influence of Gilbert Ryle,24 for a short
period the concept of the will was considered preposterous by the
majority of action theorists, but in recent years, such a concept has
become central to accounts of voluntary action. Some think that
volitions are actions of the will;25 some treat the will or volition as
simply another type of intention or trying.26  Michael Moore
carried over from DSM-III-R "change the concept of the disorder, although there are
some changes in the specific criteria." Telephone Interview with Nancy Vettorello
(April 4, 1994).
Because DSM-III-R will still be the authoritative manual as of the planned
publication date of this Article, I shall cite to both throughout.
24 See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62-69 (1949).
2 See CARL GINET, ON ACTION 31 (1990) (noting that "will comes as close as any"
verb to describing volition).
26 See ALFRED R. MELE, SPRINGS OF ACTION: UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONAL
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argues that the will or volition is a functional mental state that
translates desires, beliefs, and more general intentions into "basic"
actions, including by resolving conflicts between intentions.27 This
and similar functional accounts emphatically reject equating
volitions with wants.21 In sum, modern theories treat the will in
one fashion or another as an executory function.
Once one understands the meaning of the will or volition, it
becomes apparent that the problem in control cases is not with the
will, understood as an executory, functional state. The victim of a
threat of death and the person motivated by beliefs generated by
hallucinations or delusions are both able to execute the actions that
will, respectively, save them from death or satisfy their crazily
motivated desire/belief sets. 29  Indeed, none of the nine cases
above raised a problem with the will or volition, with the person's
ability to execute more general intentions. Even if an agent's body
is literally forced to move despite her strong desire to remain still,
there is no defect or problem of the will. In the patellar reflex/
mechanism case, the will was simply out of the picture altogether.
There was no intention to execute. In the physical compulsion case,
the agent's will was perfectly capable of executing the intention to
resist the stronger assailant. Agents can be physically forced or
psychologically compelled to act against their desires, but the
executory state is intact.
Now consider a case in contrast to the patellar reflex instance,
in which the agent's muscles are temporarily rendered helpless,
unbeknownst to her. For example, suppose she is sitting with her
BEHAVIOR 193 (1992) (noting that volitions "are not actions," but are "proximal
intentions"); Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele, The Intention/Volition Debate, 22 CAN.
J. PHIL. 323, 332 (1992) (noting that the term "trying can do the explanatory work
attributed to volitions").
27 See MOORE, supra note 5, at 113-65. Moore claims that the functional mental
state that does the work is an "intention," what he terms a type of "bare intention,"
which "executes our more general plans into discrete bodily movements." Id. at 121;
see also ALAN DONAGAN, CHOICE: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN HUMAN ACTION 21
(1987) (noting that an "acceptable theory of intention must show that human action
can be explained neither in terms of beliefs and felt desires alone" but as "a general
power to choose intellectual appetitive attitudes, whether they be choices to do now
what you believe to be in your power, or wishes, or intentions").
28 See MOORE, supra note 5, at 120 ("[lIt is... not plausible to treat volitions as
wants of any kind."); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 66-67 (1986) (noting
that Immanuel Kant believed that "one possesses a will that is ... a faculty distinct
from desire" (citation omitted)).
2 See HERBERT FINGARETrE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 55-65 (1979).
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legs crossed and is unaware that one leg has "gone to sleep." She
now desires to get up and walk across the room. As she starts to
rise, the leg fails to bear her weight and she falls, her desires
thwarted, at least until the leg "wakes up." Once again, there was
nothing wrong with the will. Her executory mental functioning
worked perfectly, but an inadvertent, temporary circulatory problem
caused her muscles to fail. Even in cases of so-called "weakness of
the will," in which an agent acts contrary to her strongest desire,
belief, or intention," the agent's action is clearly the intentional
product of a well-functioning will."'
In some of these cases, of course, we say colloquially that the
agent's will was "overborne" in the sense that either the agent was
forced to move or felt she "had to" act contrary to their preferenc-
es. But this is a misleading, metaphorical locution. As noted,
volitions are not wants or desires:3 2 on the best theory, they are
a species of intention. In the cases of no act and action alike,
moving or acting contrary to other desires, beliefs, or intentions
does not entail a problem with the will. Nonetheless, for various
reasons some people undeniably seem to lack self-control, either
more generally or in specific contexts. These people find it more
difficult to behave themselves and are more disposed to offend than
others who are better controlled. Still, the problem is not a defect
in the will as an executory state of bare intention. The problem lies
elsewhere.
3 3
One possible exception to the conclusion that out-of-control
agents have intact wills might be cases in which there is a duty to act
and the agent wants to do his duty, but he is psychologically
"paralyzed." I have never encountered ajudicial opinion addressing
this issue, nor, I suspect, does it occur often in ordinary life. Still,
such a case is surely possible. Imagine a parent with a pathological
fear of open spaces, so-called "agoraphobia." He totally encloses
and child-proofs the yard of the house so that his toddler can safely
play unsupervised in the yard. Despite his admirable caution, the
toddler one day suffers some obvious, untoward event, such as a
seizure, that requires immediate attention. The parent wants to
s' I state the object of the conflict in the disjunctive because the nature of the
conflict is contested and I do not wish to beg the question against any position.
s See MOORE, supra note 5, at 140-41 (noting that agents "intentionally do acts
that flout their strongest desires").
32 See supra text accompanying note 28.
" See infra part III.
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rush out to help the child-there is no conflict of desire, belief, or
intention whatsoever-but he is "unable" to, experiencing "paraly-
sis." We can even imagine that by brute force of will he goes to the
door and starts to go out, but anxiety and its psychophysiological
concomitants cause him to faint. Our hapless parent plausibly
suffers from a volitional defect that interfered with his desire to do
his duty. Truly he could not help himself. But if we were to
exempt him from responsibility, note that the basis would be lack
of action, not a control excuse. Note, too, that this case is recharac-
terizable as an irrationality problem if, as seems plausible, the
parent's groundless fear of open spaces is deemed irrational.
Sometimes it is said that the "problem" with agents out of
control is that they lack "free will." In almost all instances, however,
this assertion cannot correctly mean either that there is a defect in
the agent's executory mental functioning, or that action is out of
control because it is determined or the product of universal
causation. Often, I believe, the "unfree" will claim is used rhetori-
cally to buttress an insufficiently supported conclusion that the out-
of-control agent ought to be excused, because we all "know" that
free will is a necessary component of, and perhaps sufficient for,
moral and legal responsibility. This move creates a tautology,
however, and a conclusory label, no matter how rhetorically
powerful, does not provide justifications and criteria for excuse.
A more promising approach, although daunting, would be to
enter the highly contested, technical free will literature to see what
can be made of the claim that out-of-control agents lack free will.
For example, one might say that only agents capable of rational self-
reflection on their reasons for action possess free will34 and it is
precisely this capacity that out-of-control agents lack. Or, one might
say that agents lack free will if they act under certain constraints,
such as externally imposed threats of serious harm or strong desires
that the agent does not desire to possess-just the types of condi-
tions that often lead to claims for control excuses.35 I will return
" See, e.g., Randolph Clarke, Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility, 66
PHIL. STUD. 53, 54-55 (1992) (noting that an "agent who acts with free will directs her
behavior on the basis of her view of the situation in which she acts"). But see Richard
Double, How Rational Must Free Will Be?, 23 METAPHILOSOPHY 268, 277-78 (1992)
(claiming that the quality of an agent's reasons has no bearing on freedom and
denying the existence of free will).
35 See, e.g., HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11, 24 (1988) (noting that "[a] person's
will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants"); see also JONATHAN CLOVER,
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to such arguments in Part IV of this Article, 6 but note that such
arguments are, once again, not addressed to defects in the agent's
narrowly conceived executory functioning or to problems that the
truth of determinism might create. 7 Rather, they are claims about
the proper criteria for the moral responsibility of intentional agents-
irrationality or coercion, for example; they are decidedly not about
automatons or mechanisms.
In sum, trying to underpin control excuses in terms of will or
volitional problems or lack of free will is likely to be inaccurate,
confusing, rhetorical, or in its best incarnation, a placeholder for a
fuller, more adequate theory of excusing conditions. The will and
free will are not legal criteria, and agents in the criminal justice
system would do well to dispense with employing them in responsi-
bility analysis and attribution.
E. Irresistible Impulses?
Although an "irresistible impulse" is not a currently favored
control excuse, it remains a criterion for legal insanity in some
jurisdictions and it seems to exert a hold on the legal, mental
health,3" and popular imagination. "Impulse control disorders" are
an established category of mental disorders, 39 some of which, such
as "intermittent explosive disorder," kleptomania, pathological
gambling, and pyromania, may produce behavior for which the
agent will seek an excuse. Moreover, impulsive behavior is blamed
for much criminal conduct and other antisocial behavior." Thus,
there is reason to believe that attention to problematic impulses and
RESPONSIBILITY 61 (1970) (asserting that the three main types of excusable intentional
acts are ones committed in response to threats, torture, or extreme need).
6 These arguments are addressed most specifically in Part IV.A. "Hierarchical"
accounts of freedom, such as those deployed by Frankfurt, see supra note 35, are
discussed infra notes 112-22.5
3
7 ee P.S. Greenspan, Behavior Control and Freedom of Action, in MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 191-204 (John M. Fischer ed., 1986).
' See, e.g., Marcus J. Goldman, Kleptomania: Making Sense of the Nonsensical, 148
AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 986, 986 (1991) ("Kleptomania, or the irresistible impulse to steal
unneeded objects"); cf. Howard P. Rome, Personal Reflections: Impulse ControlDisorders,
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Feb. 1992, at 58 (arguing that "loss of control" is a common,
"paramount" feature of impulse control disorders).
'9 DSM-II-R, supra note 23, at 321-28; DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 609-21.
40 
See, e.g., MICHAEL GOTfFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME 85-120 (1990); Willard L.Johnson et al., Impulsive Behavior and Substance Abuse,
in THE IMPULSIVE CLIENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 225-46 (William G.
McCown et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE IMPULSIVE CLIENT].
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impulsivity should shed light on control excuses. Once again,
however, although the basic concepts appear clearly relevant to
control difficulties, the potential for metaphor and confusion
warrants caution.
Human beings incontrovertibly can be subject to momentary
and apparently capricious passions that leave them feeling subjec-
tively unfree and that seem to compromise their ability to control
themselves. Such fleeting passions are often termed impulses and
should be distinguished from cases in which such impulses are
dispositional, which are usually termed impulsive or compulsive.
41
Both impulses and compulsions are often thought to have the
potential for coercive motivational force.4 2 Such observations,
however characterized, are within the domain of common sense.
The question is how these commonplaces bear on the justification
for control excuses.
Note, first, that the impulses at issue are desires, fleeting and
unconsidered desires to be sure, but simply desires nonetheless. If
an agent acts to satisfy such a desire, doing so will surely be an
intentional act executed by an undeniably effective will, and there
is no reason to believe that universal causation or determinism plays
a special role in such cases. The agent may have a strongly felt need
to satisfy the impulse, but why is this different from standard cases
of people desiring to fulfill momentary, strong desires? What would
it mean to say that such a desire was literally irresistible? The lure
of mechanism is clearly at work, but should be resisted. After all,
why should a powerful desire-really, really wanting something-be
assimilated to the patellar reflex? One possibility is that such
impulses create a hard choice, but if so, hard choice analysis will do
the work.4 3 A more likely possibility is that unthinking action in
response to thoughtless or ephemerally thoughtful, momentary
desires should be judged irrational in appropriate cases. But is such
action better understood as irrational or as simply nonrational? In
either case, rationality problems and not some supposed irresistible
quality of the desire would be the ground for excuse when action is
impulsive. Finally, it is famously the case that even if impulses do
4' See William G. McCown & Philip A. DeSimone, Impulses, Impulsivity, and
Impulsive Behaviors: A Historical Review of a Contemporary Issue, in THE IMPULSIVE
CLIENT, supra note 40, at 3, 4.
42 See GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF
SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 205 (1992).
s When hard choices should excuse is addressed in detail in Part IV.A.
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have coercive motivational force, it is impossible to differentiate
"irresistible" impulses from those simply not resisted.
Impulsivity is a disposition or tendency to act with less fore-
thought, or steeper time discounting, than most people of similar
ability and knowledge." Despite the apparent consensus on this
general definition, more specific criteria or descriptions have
proved elusive.45 It is reasonable to assume, however, that at least
some people who meet the general definition are dysfunctional, that
is, suffer generally negative consequences, as a result of impul-
sivity. 6 This assumption, too, is a commonplace and once again
raises questions about why a disposition to act impulsively, as well
as acting on an individual impulse, should excuse.
The dispositionally impulsive agent surely acts intentionally, with
an effective will, and not under any particular influence of universal
causation or determinism. Like the agent acting in response to an
individual impulse, the dispositionally impulsive agent acting
impulsively may experience a hard choice or act irrationally or
nonrationally, but literal irresistibility will not be the operative
variable to justify an excuse. Furthermore, an habitually impulsive
person may have less ground for an excuse than an agent suddenly
and unpredictably faced with an impulse: the dispositionally
impulsive person knows that she is especially likely to act thought-
lessly and may therefore be held accountable for failure to take
those steps that might remedy habitual impulsiveness or avoid those
situations that facilitate it. One might argue in response, of course,
that the dispositionally impulsive agent lacks the ability to plan
ahead by taking such steps. If the agent genuinely did lack this
ability, then blame would not be warranted. But the difficulty in
planning ahead is likely to be a matter of degree, rather than an all-
or-none quality. If so, the degree of difficulty required to excuse
will be a normative judgment.
47
I believe that the general intuition supporting an argument for
" See Scott Dickman, Impulsivity and Information Processing, in THE IMPULSIVE
CLIENT, supra note 40, at 151; McCown & DeSimone, supra note 41, at 4.
" See McCown & DeSimone, supra note 41, at 5; see also Dickman, supra note 44,
at 153 (claiming that many of the inconsistencies in the impulsivity literature can be
resolved by inferring the specific cognitive processes in which subjects differ).
46See Scott Dickman, Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity: Personality and
Cognitive Correlates, 58J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 95 (1990).
4 The technology for assessing the irresistibility of impulsive behavior is addressed
in Part V. I conclude that we lack the technology validly to measure the strength of
impulses and impulsiveness.
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excusing the dispositionally impulsive agent is not that desires are
irresistible or that hard choice or irrationality exists. It is, instead,
that the agent has the misfortune to possess a character trait that
makes behaving oneself more difficult.48 Character rarely furnish-
es the basis for a legal excuse, however. The law assumes that
people who are characterologically thoughtless, careless, pugna-
cious, excitable, cowardly, cruel, and the like can be expected to
control themselves and should be held accountable if they violate
the law. True, it may be harder for such people to behave, but the
law assumes that they do not lack the ability to do so. Finally, if
such characterological considerations were the basis for a control
excuse, it would be because we decided as a normative matter that
certain prophylactic personality traits were necessary for responsi-
bility, not because the desires of characterologically disadvantaged
agents were uniquely "irresistible."
F. Choice, Hard Choice, and Control
Some claim that responsibility resides in the ability to choose,
49
an assertion that seems to support excusing out-of-control agents
because, it is alleged, they have no choice. Philosophers of mind
and action dispute the precise contours of choosing (understood as
an agent's mental act),5" but the technical intricacies of the concept
are not central to the ordinary language notion that might justify
control excuses. Nonetheless, the concept of choice so employed
is ambiguous. Understood as a mental act, sometimes "choosing"
seems to refer to the act of deciding between (at least two)
alternative courses of action (or nonaction). Other times, choice as
a mental act seems to be synonymous with acting intentionally ("I
chose to go out for ice cream"). Finally, choice sometimes refers to
a feature of the agent's world that might be described as the
4' The array of such traits and qualities that makes behaving oneself harder and
easier is discussed in Part III.
49 See, e.g., KADISH, supra note 13, at 85-88; Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of
Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719,
722, 726, 737-38 (1992).
50 Compare MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 165
(1987) (noting that "intention is tied to further reasoning and action in ways in which
choice need not be: that is why we do not intend everything that is an element in
what we choose") with MELE, supra note 26, at 140-41, 152 n.16 (noting that when
deciding to perform an act, one also has the intention to perform the act). Such
dispute about "choice" is unsurprising because the contours of all mental furniture
are similarly contested.
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alternative courses of action that were available ("I want ice cream,
but none is available in my location or any other place I can go, and
thus I have no choice about whether I shall have ice cream today").
Let us consider these ordinary uses of choice to understand why
lack of choice or opportunity is an inaccurate or potentially
confusing justification for control excuses.
Neither mental act usage is promising as a foundation for
control excuses. As a general matter, out-of-control agents seem
unproblematically able to choose between alternatives. If there is
a gun at one's head, one may find it exceedingly easy to choose to
accede to the wrongful death threat. Similarly, the hallucinating
agent has the mental capacity to choose to kick at the hallucinated
dog rather than passively endure the feared attack. In the patellar
reflex case, there simply was no choice as a mental act, but this is a
case of no action and not an appropriate case for a control excuse.
In the example of physical compulsion by the person who forces the
agent's leg up, the hapless agent has no choice, but not because the
capacity to choose, as a mental capacity, was impaired. Indeed, the
agent chooses between resistance and nonresistance, but, once
again, the leg's movement upward was not the agent's act.
In some cases, a nonculpably ignorant or irrational agent may
not be aware that a choice is possible. One might then claim that,
at least in this instance, the agent does lack the ability to make a
choice. Although this is not an implausible claim, note that it is
entirely parasitic on other standard excusing conditions-ignorance
and irrationality-which are doing all the work. In other cases, the
agent might claim that the irresistibility of a desire deprived her of
the capacity to make a choice. Again, such a characterization is
plausible. But, assuming the validity of the claim about the strength
of the desire, it seems more accurate to say, like the case of the
agent acting under duress, that she was psychologically compelled
to make a hard choice. She did, after all, choose to yield to the
desire. Indeed, the strength of the desire made her choice easy, and
if she struggled with conflict about yielding, this underscores the
presence of the capacity to choose. The American Psychiatric
Association's generic definition of "compulsive behavior" as, inter
alia, "purposeful," "intentional," and "designed to neutralize or to
prevent discomfort or some dreaded event or situation,"51 again
" DSM-III-R, supra note 23, at 245; see also DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 423 (worded
slightly differently, but conceptually similar).
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further supports the conclusion that the agent is able to exercise
choice. Even if conflict remains "unresolved," agents are able to
exercise and implement choice.5 2 In "irreSistible desire" cases,
then, some theory of psychological compulsion rather than lack of
a capacity to choose is the possible justification for a control
excuse. 53  And if the terror of the choice set renders the agent
"unable to think," such that no choice is possible, this is a rationality
defect.
As a synonym for lack of intentional action, the other mental act
notion, lack of choice as the basis for control excuses suffers from
the same defects identified in the Sections above on intention and
the will. Out-of-control agents choose their acts in this sense, so
they do not lack choice in the same sense. In sum, lack of mental
capacity to make a choice will not furnish general support for
control excuses.
Lack of choice as lack of alternatives or opportunity is more
promising, but this meaning can be both literal and metaphorical:
to avoid the ever-present lure of mechanism, one must distinguish
the two. On occasion, literally no relevant alternative action is open
to an agent. The patellar reflex and physical compulsion examples
are just such cases that defeat the prima facie responsibility require-
ments, which include a voluntary act. In contrast, some alternatives
are available in all the out-of-control cases.
Those wishing to draw the analogy to examples of no literal
choice claim that the agent had no "real" choice, or no reasonable
choice. Indeed, we talk this way colloquially all the time. In brief,
a hard choice is equated with no choice. For example, the person
acting under sufficient duress has a choice-she might refuse to
harm another, despite the awfulness of the threat-but she is a
nonculpable victim of a wrongfully imposed hard choice and we
cannot fairly expect her not to yield. For another example, the
hallucinating agent had the option of doing nothing, but her mental
disorder deprived her of the relevant information necessary
rationally to understand her range of alternatives-there was no
attacking dog, after all. Even judged from her internal point of
view, passively enduring the attack of a vicious dog is (all things
being equal) not a reasonable option that we can require of anyone.
5-2 ISAAC LEVI, HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFLICT
34 (1986).
" I shall discuss issues of ignorance, irrationality, and compulsion asjustifications
for control excuses in Part IV.
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Hard choice cases in which we cannot expect the agent to
behave differently undeniably exist, but note that what does the
excusing work is not a defect in the agent. Instead, we are making
a moral judgment about when options are so constrained that it is
simply unfair to require the agent to behave otherwise. It is not
that the agent literally was forced to do wrong and thus literally had
no choice. Rather, as a moral matter, we might excuse because the
choice the agent faced was too hard. Finally, even if hard choice
situations explain why some out-of-control agents might be excused,
many allegedly out-of-control agents, such as the impulsive person
or the person without other-regarding understanding, might not be
in a constrained choice situation at all. Hard choice does not mean
that the agent lacks the capacity to exercise choice and it fails to
furnish a general justification for excusing out-of-control agents.
I conclude that although colloquial talk about lack of choice is
commonly used to characterize many out-of-control cases, it is often
inaccurate and potentially misleading, as when the lure of mecha-
nism leads to the conclusion that no difference exists between cases
of no literal choice and cases of hard choice. Out-of-control agents
should sometimes be excused, but not because they do not choose
to do what they do. These cases are better analyzed directly in
terms of ordinary justifications for excusing conditions, such as
irrationality and coercion, as I try to do in Part IV. Before turning
to this analysis, however, I shall first address those variables that
help us remain in control.
III. FLYING STRAIGHT
The desire to do evil to our fellow humans, animals, and the
world around us is ubiquitous. Few people have the good fortune
to be free of such desires, and some people are burdened with
intense desires to cause harm. How do enough people manage to
fly straight in the face of these nasty desires and thus make human
society possible? In this part of the Article, I propose a set of "self-
protective" variables or devices that predispose people to stay on
the straight and narrow and without which straight flight is difficult.
Considering these variables allows us to see the commonsensical
kernel of truth when an agent claims that she was out of control.
It is harder to behave well, to "control oneself," to conform one's
conduct to the requirements of the law, if one is not favored by
possessing the "right stuff." But this accurate commonplace of
moral psychology must be distinguished from the misleading
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analogies to mechanism that are used to support claims for control
excuses. If morality and the law grant an excuse if an agent lacks
one or more of such variables, the proper justification is that a
requirement of moral agency is lacking, not that the agent is out of
control in the metaphorically mechanistic sense.
Rather than presuming to present an exhaustive account of
moral psychology, I hope simply and briefly to suggest the major
categories. I do not offer a developmental account, but instead
include the relevant variables, however they may have come to exist.
I focus on intrapersonal rather than social variables: although the
latter exert strong causal force on the former, they usually operate
through personal agency, and, ultimately, responsibility for criminal
behavior is personal.54  For convenience, I shall discuss the
variables in absolute terms, but it should be remembered that the
strength of all may range along a continuum. I assume that most
adults have relatively stable, "characteristic" types and amounts of
the self-protective variables, but their strength can vary at different
times in a person's life. All the variables also have negative
potential, but I shall focus only on the protective possibilities.
Finally, I do not try to assess how many of these variables must
obtain or in what strength and combination to insure straight flight.
That task is beyond anyone's capability.
The first protective variable is self-consciousness, the ability to
monitor oneself. Effective human action is in general impossible
without it, because it provides continuous feedback that permits us
to adjust and readjust our conduct appropriately to surrounding
circumstances. Self-consciousness is a standard feature of waking
life, but it can be weakened or obliterated by a variety of causes,
including trauma, intoxication, fatigue, dissociative states, and
others. When this occurs, behaving properly is difficult because the
agent is not capable of the normal degree of awareness. It is
possible, of course, to go wrong in many ways despite normal self-
monitoring. For example, an agent might be fully aware of what she
is up to, but misperceive its import for other reasons. Sometimes
it is good to "lose oneself," but without general self-consciousness,
the chance to understand what one is doing and to fly straight
diminishes.
' Social variables, such as general economic conditions, the hardening of targets,
the availability of weapons and victims, and the luck of circumstances generally can
have a profound effect on crime rates. Causation is not an excuse, however, and as
noted in the text, responsibility in our criminal justice system is personal.
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Fear of consequences is a powerful protective variable. The fear
may be of external consequences, such as the infliction of physical
or psychological pain, or of internal consequences, such as the
experience of unpleasant psychological states like guilt or shame.
It is good to have an environment that attaches (in the appropriate
amounts and ways) negative consequences to wrongdoing, and it is
good to have a well-functioning conscience or superego.
Rationality also protects. I do not have an exalted or complicat-
ed notion here, but only the ability, in Susan Wolf's words, "to be
sensitive and responsive to relevant changes in one's situation and
environment-that is, to be flexible."5 5 It is the ability to perceive
accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason instrumentally,
including weighing the facts appropriately and according to a
minimally coherent preference-ordering. 6 Put yet another way, it
is the ability to act for good reasons and it is always a good reason
not to act (or to act) if doing so (or not doing so) will be wrong.
Having preferences and goals that meet apparent social standards
for rationality will also protect. Whether desires and ends can be
evaluated by rationality criteria is famously in dispute,5 7 but if what
you want is generally considered irrational, you are likely to get into
trouble.
Having moral desires or a disposition to behave morally also
decreases the probability that one will offend. Often we say of such
people, usually with admiration, that they have moral or good
characters. 5 Situational variables can act powerfully to enhance
55 SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 69 (1990).
56 See JENNIFER RADDEN, MADNESS AND REASON 54, 56-70, 159 (1985).
57 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 411 (L.A. Selby-Bigges ed.,
1958) (lst ed. 1896) ("'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the
whole world to the scratching of my finger."). Robert Nozick agrees that no one has
yet provided a decisive answer. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY
139-40 (1993) ("At present, we have no adequate theory of the substantive rationality
of goals and desires, to put to rest Hume's statement."). Nozick goes on to argue that
progress can be made by providing formal criteria that rational goals would have to
meet. See id. at 141-51. He provides no content, however. See also DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 120-26 (1984) (asserting that a reason's rationality depends
upon its underlying desire, and that desires can be rationally based). Others try to
provide content. See, e.g., CHARLES M. CULVER & BERNARD GERT, PHILOSOPHY IN
MEDICINE: CONCEPTUAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE AND PSYCHIATRY 35 (1982)
("[A]n irrational desire involves both wanting to suffer some evil and not having an
adequate reason for doing so."); NICHOLAS RECHER, RATIONALITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND THE RATIONALE OF REASON 92-106 (1988) (arguing
that "appropriateness" is the crucial evaluative criterion for the rationality of ends).
I return to this issue in Part IV.
-s SeeJOELJ. KUPPERMAN, CHARACTER 8-9, 59, 151-52 (1991).
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or counteract any character,5 9 but, holding situations constant,
straight flight is easier if the moral pilot is an ace.6" It is of course
possible to fly straight even if one is inundated with wrongful
desires, but it certainly will be harder.
Moderate temperament or emotions are useful, too. For
Aristotle this was one of the marks of virtue.6' Anger, envy, and
jealousy, for example, come immediately to mind as normal and
often appropriate emotions that can wreak havoc on one's moral life
by motivating awful behavior if uncontrolled. Moreover, becoming
"too emotional" notoriously interferes with rationality, which is
itself a classic self-protective variable. Indeed, it may make sense to
conceive of inappropriately extreme emotions as irrational.62
The capacity for empathy and identification with others is
helpful. Criminal behavior harms and wrongs others, and agents
understand the import of this more clearly if they can empathize
with the pain potential victims will suffer. Such empathy strength-
ens one's reasons not to victimize. Psychopaths have great difficulty
flying straight.
63
Having at one's command various self-control strategies that are
either on "automatic pilot" or motivated in the right circumstances
can be a genuine helpmeet for avoiding the crooked path.6' These
methods can range in sophistication and subtlety, from techniques
informed by research,65 to the brute resistance we term "sheer
59 See OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM 260-75 (1991); KUPPERMAN, supra note 58, at 59.
'0 See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,1587 (1992) (claiming
that the moral agent must be able to include moral considerations in practical
reasoning).
61 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bks. II-IV (Martin Ostwald trans. 1962).
For a contemporary interpretation, seeJ.O. Urmson, Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean,
in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 157 (Amelie Rorty ed., 1980).
62 See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENT 36-40 (1990) (also noting that the point is controversial).
62 See infra part IV.B. See generally ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE
DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US (1993).
64 See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 40, at 85-120 (positing that "low self-
control" is the variable best predictive of an agent's propensity to offend). For
interesting discussions of self-control strategies, see ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY:
AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-CONTROL 50-62 (1987); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57
(1984).
65 See, e.g., AINSLIE, supra note 42, at 130-44 (providing picoeconomic explication
of four precommitment strategies); MARTIN SELIGMAN, WHAT YOU CAN CHANGE AND
WHAT YOU CAN'T: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL SELF-IMPROVEMENT 147-222
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willpower." When nasty desires threaten to crank up or when one
wants to engage in behavior, say drinking, that one knows will
facilitate those desires, it is good to have successful methods
available, whether or not crude, to suppress the desires or to
preclude the facilitating conduct.
With some hesitation, I include good judgment or practical
wisdom, partially distinguishable from theoretical reason, as the
final self-protective variable. Common parlance makes the distinc-
tion, but I hesitate still because I am not sure exactly what the
commonsense notion is, and it deconstructs readily under analy-
sis. 66 Still, we use the concept all the time, and it seems to do the
work that "pure reason" does not do. In any case, we all feel
mightily complimented if others say we have it, and we are certainly
better able to behave ourselves if it is true.
Although all the self-protective variables or devices are helpful
and it is a misfortune to lack any of them, it is not clear that
responsibility is contingent upon possessing all of them in the
minimally necessary amounts. Virtually all accounts of responsibility
include self-awareness and rationality, but others, such as the
capacities for empathy and guilt, are more controversial.67 When
addressing whether it is justifiable to blame and punish someone for
wrongdoing, however, it will be useful to consider what self-
protective variables the person possesses (or can be held account-
able for failing to develop) 6 and to remember that possession of
the variables is mostly a function of heredity and environmental
factors during childhood and adolescence that were not determined
by the agent. It is a normative question whether or not we wish to
include the lack of a self-protective variable among our reasons to
(1993) (discussing sexual behavior, eating, and alcohol consumption).
6 See PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT 1-8 (1993)
(questioning the distinction between intellectual skill and practical wisdom). But see
Paul B. Baltes et al., Wisdom and Successful Aging, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION: PSYCHOLOGY AND AGING 123, 134-39 (Theo B. Sonderegger ed., 1992)
(noting that empirical research on wisdom is in its infancy, but that the concept
appears best understood as "expert knowledge in the fundamental pragmatics of life
permitting exceptional insight andjudgment involving complex and uncertain matters
of the human condition").
6 See generally Arenella, supra note 60, at 1544-608.
6 Peter Arenella has suggested that the capacity for self-management of one's
character is a necessary prerequisite of moral agency. See id. at 1609, 1615 n.120,
1618 n.128. He does not specify the criteria for this capacity, however, so it is
unclear if it is a distinct self-protective variable or an amalgam of some of those
already discussed, such as self-awareness, rationality, and self-control.
1994] 1609
1610 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 1587
excuse, but answering that question will be easier if we have some
empirical sense of how hard it was for a person to fly straight
without it.
Finally, it is important to distinguish the various factors that
comprise the agent's ability to fly straight, and thus to conform to
the law, from the unanalyzed and loosely expressed conclusions that
the agent suffered from a defect of volition, intention, or choice.
For example, an agent who acts in response to irrational belief/
desire sets has trouble conforming to the law because she is
irrational, not because her will is unable to execute her irrational,
more general intentions. Indeed, the case only comes to the law's
attention because the agent's will was able to execute her irrational
belief/desire sets and to do harm. Difficulties in flying straight
almost never result from "defects" of volition, intention, or choice,
as we shall see in more detail in the next Part of the Article.
IV. LOST CONTROL? CONTROL EXCUSES EXAMINED
In this Part, I address a wide variety of common circumstances
in which offenders claim that they nonculpably could not control
themselves and therefore should be excused. I conclude that
notions of loss of control are almost always parasitic upon other
justifications for excuse and that the notion of loss of control
unduly threatens to mislead or confuse legislators, criminal justice
system participants, and the public, even in those situations in which
loss of control appears to be a plausible characterization of the
defendant's behavior. I begin with the two classic cases of control
excuses-duress and so-called irresistible impulse, or as I prefer to
term it, "internal coercion"-both of which are based on some
theory of coercion or compulsion. I then move to harder cases:
psychopathy; the influence of dynamically unconscious motivation;
cases at the border of no action and excused action, such as
dissociative states, that should illuminate both sides of the border;
and cases of deprivation or "rotten social background." Part IV con-
cludes with discussion of the implications of the analysis for
suggested new defenses based on a wide array of purported
syndromes, such as battered victim syndrome and the like.
69
69 1 do not separately discuss clear cases of no action because, as has been
repeatedly stressed, they deny the requirement of a voluntary act and do not properly
raise control excuses.
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A. Lack of Control as Hard Choice: Duress and Internal
Coercion
70
This Section begins with a discussion of the general criteria for
coercion and then applies them to cases of duress occasioned by
external threats and to cases of "internal coercion" caused by
internal threats. The latter are variously fashioned as "coercion,"
"involuntariness," "irresistible impulse," "compulsion," "volitional,"
or "control" problems. In the remainder of this Section, I shall use
these phrases interchangeably because they all address the same
conceptual domain of excuse and there is no uncontroversial reason
to prefer any of them.
71
The almost universal acceptance of excusing claims of duress
and coercion in criminal and civil law testifies to the implicit
assumption that an excuse on these grounds should sometimes
obtain. That is, the law often accepts that there are appropriate
cases for excuse when the person claims, "I could not help myself."
Nevertheless, understanding of coercion is far less established than
understanding of defects of rationality. Although rationality is a
normative concept about which there is no consensus among
philosophers, psychologists, and others, there is a rough, common-
sense consensus about the meaning of "everyday" rationality and its
place in practical reason. In contrast, no consensus about the
meaning of "coercion" exists among "experts" or laypeople.
Consequently, my strategy is to begin with a choice among compet-
ing models of interpersonal coercion, about which much has been
written. I shall first apply the chosen model to cases of duress.
Coercion claims based on mental abnormality and other causes of
internal threats are usually "one-party" cases, however. I shall
therefore apply the chosen two-party model to such cases to
determine if conceptual and practical progress is possible.
Theories of coercion may be classified into two types-empirical
and moral. The former rely on analogies to cases of physical
compulsion and suggest criteria for when a nonphysically compelled
70 This Section shamelessly cannibalizes and alters an earlier treatment of the same
subject. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAw 239, 250-65 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
71 But see CULVER & GERT, supra note 57, at 116-17 (distinguishing external
coercion from inner compulsion because the compulsive agent cannot will not to will
the compelled conduct in the appropriate circumstances). I find Culver and Gert's
distinction somewhat obscure and unpersuasive for the reasons this Subsection
provides.
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actor is deprived psychologically of the ability to behave otherwise.
Psychological pressure or some negative affective calculus are the
variables that do the work. (Remember that determinism is
irrelevant to such criteria because if determinism were true and
always produced coercion, then all action would be coerced.) The
claim is that psychological compulsion makes it literally impossible
for the person not to perform the allegedly compelled action.
7 2
Moral theorists abandon the quest for an empirical test because
they believe that it is technically impracticable and normatively
undesirable. They claim that the analogy to true physical compul-
sion is inapt and that we lack the understanding and expertise to
"measure" the ability to do otherwise in the absence of physical
compulsion or threats, such as a gun to one's head, that can be
commonsensically assessed. Therefore, most empirical conclusions
about coercion, especially those based on purely internal causes
such as mental abnormality, are simply that, conclusions, unsupport-
ed by evidence. Even examples that intuitively support the
empirical view, such as impulse disorders and substance abuse,
derive their force from conceptual and factual premises that are far
weaker and more controversial than their proponents assume.
7 3
Moreover, virtually all general empirical work addressed to the
problems are unpersuasive or marginally relevant.
Perhaps most importantly, moral theorists argue that intuitions
about psychological coercion that depend on the analogy with
mechanistic, physical causation are often inconsistent with our
considered moral evaluations and thus the former should not guide
the latter unless the intuitions are well supported and the consid-
ered moral evaluation is unjustified. 4 The facts upon which the
analogy rests are highly problematic, however, and as we shall see,
coercion excuses do not depend on the presence of "pressure," and
coerced agents do act for reasons: they are not automatons; their
movements are actions. Further, we believe upon moral reflection
that the ability to resist should and does vary according to the
' See Gardner, supra note 14, at 67, 73, 79. Mr. Gardner also claims that the
analogy to physical compulsion is virtually perfect and not metaphorical and that the
psychologically compelled agent does not choose. See also CULVER & GERT, supra note
57, at 116.
7
3 See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING: THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM
AS A DISEASE (1988); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA.
L. REV. 509,514 (1989) (arguing that "addictive behavior is chosen, not compelled").
74 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 22, at xi (endorsing the view that "coercion claims
are moralized .... they involve moral judgments at their core").
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circumstances, 5 and yielding to the desire should excuse only in
some circumstances. For example, we do not excuse a drug
dependent person who commits armed robbery to obtain money to
buy drugs, no matter how much internal pressure the agent alleges
to have felt. 6 The analogy to a literally irresistible mechanism is
simply too far-fetched properly to persuade us that such serious
wrongdoing should be excused.
I have been convinced by the arguments of the empirical
skeptics and moralizers, such as Fingarette,77 Nozick 8 and
Wertheimer, 9 that a moralized approach is conceptually and
practically preferable, despite its own difficulties." Moreover,
moral models dominate discussion of the problem. Using a moral
model, then, the working criteria for a coercion excuse are as
follows:
First, the person is subjected to an unjustifiable threat, that is,
unjustifiable circumstances that will make the person worse off
compared to some baseline, if she does not perform the wrongful
act.
" See Carl Elliott, Moral Responsibility, Psychiatric Disorders and Duress, 8J. APPLIED
PHIL. 45, 47 (1991).
76 See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(denying a lack of control excuse to a heroin-addicted defendant charged with
possession of heroin).
" See Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist Analysis of Coercion, Deception,
Undue Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 65 passim (1985).
As Fingarette notes in speaking generally about coercion, "what looks like a comment
about psychological causality becomes ... a statement about the act's normative
status under legal standards of wrongfulness and reasonableness." Id. at 88-89; see
also FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 29, at 51-65.
78 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (attempting to
"clarify the concept of coercion" and recognizing that there is an irreducibly
normative component).
79 See WERTHEIMER, supra note 22, at xi (arguing that principles of coercion involve
moral judgments).
' More detail concerning the virtues and defects of the moralized approach is
found throughout this Section and in Part V, concerning the factual assessment and
adjudication of control excuses. On the problems-and virtues-with Wertheimer's
moral model, see, for example,Jerome E. Bickenbach, Critical Notice, 20 CAN.J. PHIL.
577, 581-82 (1990) (describing Wertheiner's book as "fascinating, readable, and
persuasive," yet criticizing it for Wertheimer's insistence on "draw[ing] the contrast
between moralized and non-moralized interpretations of coercion too sharply"); Tony
Honor6, A Theoy of Coercion, 10 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 94, 95 (1990) (arguing that
"Wertheimer's analysis fits 'hard choice' better than 'defective capacity' cases, but
does not fit either exactly").
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Second, performing the wrongful act and suffering the threat-
ened consequences for failing to perform it are both aversive
choices, but doing the wrongful act is an excusable alternative
because it is unfair to require the agent to refrain under the
circumstances.
Third, the person is not responsible either for placing herself in
or for failing to avoid the circumstances that produced the hard
choice. In other words, coercion exists when the actor is not
physically forced to act, but unjustifiable circumstances produce a
hard choice and the agent cannot fairly be expected to avoid
choosing to do wrong. Even though the person has a choice among
actions-that is, no superior force is physically moving her body-
there is no "real" or "acceptable" alternative, and the person cannot
be expected to act otherwise.
Why adopt this particular, moral test of coercion? Various
writers have attempted to grapple with the criteria for coercion, but
although virtually all adopt a moral model, no particular test has
achieved any consensus among philosophers. Each is subject to
challenging counterexamples that expose fuzziness in the concepts,
such as the difference between threats and offers, or that lead to
results that seem undesirable. Consequently, one must simply make
a choice, and the test chosen is, I believe, at least consistent with the
various duress and coercion criteria in criminal and civil law.
8
1
Moreover, the first criterion distinguishes threats, which are usually
thought to decrease choice and increase coercion, from offers,
which are usually thought to increase choice and decrease coercion,
even if the offer is one the offeree "can't refuse." 2 Some would
argue that offers and mixed cases ("throffers") can also be coercive,
but this is a minority view that would tend to excuse people most
observers wish to hold responsible. The threat must be unjustified
because, within a moral model, a person should yield to a morally
or legally sanctioned threat. Finally, even if unjustified threats are
a necessary element, setting the baseline is itself problematic. As
Wertheimer explains, the baseline can be statistical, phenomeno-
logical, or itself moralized."3 This last approach is best, because it
8' See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (stating the elements of a duress
defense).
82 See Daniel Lyons, The Last Word on Coercive Offers ... (?), 1983 PHIL. RES.
ARCHIVES 393 passim.
8' See WERTHEIMER, supra note 22, at 206-11.
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will yield a test for moral and legal excuse that does not collapse
into conventionalism or unbridled subjectivity.
Turning to the second criterion, the threatened consequence
and the wrongful act must both be aversive outcomes, or the person
is not facing a hard choice. If the consequence is desired, the
circumstance is no threat, and if the person desires independently
to perform the wrongful act, then again there is no hard choice
because the threat does not furnish the motive for the wrongful act.
For example, the drug user or gambler who uses drugs or gambles
primarily for pleasure and thrills and not to avoid anxiety or
depression does not face a hard choice. But how hard must the
choice be to warrant an excuse? This is the question that morality
and the law must decide according to the circumstances of each
context in which it arises. Once again, we are adopting a moral test
that depends on social judgment, and the law generally requires
very substantial threats before it will excuse agents for criminal
conduct.
Finally, even if the agent is coerced according to the first two
criteria, an excuse will not obtain if the agent was responsible either
for placing herself in the situation or for failing to employ possible,
resistant strategies. An agent who causes or fails to prevent the
circumstances of her own excuse should not profit thereby.8 4 Al-
though the third criterion is not specific to coercion, 85 it is espe-
cially important when duress and mental abnormality furnish the
coercive circumstances, because avoidance and resistance strategies
are often genuinely possible.
' See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A
Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985)
(proposing a new rule for treating actors who cause the conditions of their own
defense and rejecting the "current law treatment" of such an actor with five types of
common defenses).
" The third criterion is not specific to a theory of coercion because the law often
fails to grant an excuse or justification when the actor is responsible for causing the
conditions that necessitated the excused orjustified conduct. The law is blaming an
agent for conduct that would otherwise be blameless because the agent was
blameworthy earlier. For example, the Model Penal Code holds a drunken agent
liable for recklessness even if intoxication deprived the agent of conscious awareness
of the risk she was running. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2). The justification is
that the agent was allegedly reckless in becoming drunk.
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1. Duress
Duress is seemingly the easiest case because an excuse is
apparently unproblematic in at least some instances. Remember the
generic criteria: 6 the defendant is faced with a threat of suffering
wrongful, immediate harm to herself unless she acts wrongfully, and
the threat is of such a nature and degree that a person of "reason-
able firmness" would yield to it under the circumstances.
8 7
Moreover, the defendant cannot be responsible for placing herself
in the situation in which the threat would arise. The common law
was more explicit and limiting: the threat had to be of death or
serious bodily harm, and duress would never excuse homicide, no
matter how dreadful the threat. The classic example, of course,
involves a threat of death unless the defendant commits some other
crime. 8 Under such conditions, it would not be fair to expect the
' See Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1335-47 (1989) (providing a
detailed description of common law and reformed statutory criteria).
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1).
" The common law's limitations threaten to obliterate duress as an excuse. First,
because homicide is worse than all other crimes, death threats will alwaysjustify other
crimes. Second, serious bodily harm either is arguably a greater evil than many
serious crimes, once again producing ajustification for committing the other serious
crime, or it is not sufficiently bad to cause a person of "reasonable firmness" to yield
to very serious crimes and no excuse will obtain. In sum, the general justification of
necessity will obtain in those cases in which the balance of evils is positive, as it will
always be in nonhomicide crimes occasioned by death threats or in cases of crimes
less evil than suffering serious bodily harm. For example, in one well-known case, a
gambler unable to pay his debts was threatened with serious harm to himself and his
spouse unless he aided his gambling "creditor's" insurance fraud scheme by filing
false insurance claims. See State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977). Bracketing,
for the moment, the issue of whether the gambler was responsible for placing himself
in the situation, insurance fraud is surely less evil than grievous bodily harm or death
and necessity would obtain. Duress as an excuse will otherwise seldom obtain because
one can never kill, and even serious bodily harm is unlikely to support a duress
excuse in cases involving other very serious crimes such as rape, kidnapping, arson,
and the like. A person of reasonable firmness will be expected to suffer significant
bodily harm rather than to engage in such crimes. The primary counterexample is
the famous prison escape case, in which an inmate escapes to avoid serious bodily
harm. Many courts have been willing, under usually limited conditions, to let the
issue of duress go to the jury in such instances. See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 118
Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974) ("This [duress] defense is one with severe limita-
tions and it must be established by competent evidence in a trial where the testimony
of witnesses is subject to scrutiny by the trier of fact."). The law of duress is quite
unforgiving, however, and such cases are rare. I shall assume for purposes of
discussion, or else there will be nothing to discuss, that modern common law might
permit duress as an excuse in cases of homicide when the balance of evils is not
positive.
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agent to behave otherwise or face criminal liability, blame, and
punishment. We do say that the defendant was "forced to do it" or
"couldn't help it," but what do we really mean?
Note a number of features of the criteria. Duress doctrine
implicitly adopts a ranking of the moral seriousness of doing various
evils and only allows the excuse under limited circumstances of
"objective" reasonableness that are determined according to the
implicit ranking. The criteria are infused with moral balancing and
expectations. Second, the agent's action designed to avoid the
threatened evil is decidedly intentional. The threat furnishes
excellent reason to form and to act on the intention. Third, the
criteria do not require or imply that the defendant must experience
untoward or unpleasant psychological states or that there is
anything wrong with the agent. Most people threatened with
dreadful immediate consequences will surely feel fear or "pressure"
to avoid those consequences, and extreme fear might deprive some
agents of their rationality, but such mental or affective states need
not be present to claim duress successfully. In contrast, no matter
how much fear or pressure a defendant subjectively experienced,
duress will not obtain unless the situation was one in which a person
of reasonable firmness would yield. If a person of reasonable
firmness would not yield, but the defendant was driven crazy by
honest but unreasonable fear, then an insanity defense is the
appropriate excuse. If the amount of fear is reasonable, it will be
difficult to claim that the agent was irrational if she acts to avoid the
source of the fear. Furthermore, the threatened agent's will and
ability to exercise a choice are unimpaired. Choice is wrongfully
and extremely constrained by the threat, but the defendant has and
makes a choice that the will executes quite effectively to avoid the
threat.
The claim that the duress defendant "can't help it" is metaphori-
cal and moral, rather than literal. We believe that it is unfair to ask
the agent who is threatened with substantial evil to take the
consequences rather than to do even greater evil herself. The agent
experiences a wrongful "hard choice": do evil or suffer the
threatened consequences. She can help it, but under the circum-
stances it would be unreasonable and unfair to require her to do so
upon the pain of conviction and its consequences. When it would
be unfair is not a matter of the agent's individual subjectivity, that
is, how hard was it for her, in all her particularity, not to yield.
Rather, it is a moral conclusion society and the law reach about
what we may justly expect of each other as responsible beings. We
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simply expect those who are weaker, more cowardly, fearful or the
like to buck up or face the criminal consequences, even though we
know such people find it harder to do so than those more fortunate-
ly endowed.8 9
If the justification of the duress excuse is the "reasonableness"
of the agent's yielding under the circumstances, the claim sounds
suspiciously like a justification rather than an excuse. How can
reasonable behavior be wrongful? We are here, as Kent Greenawalt
characterized the cases, at the "perplexing borders of justification
and excuse" 90 : the act is objectively wrongful because the balance
of evils is negative, but the agent subjectively behaves objectively
reasonably. Michael Moore argues, contra Greenawalt, that the
perplexing problem is solved by recognizing that justification is
dependent on the objective moral features of the act, independent of
the reasonableness of the agent's reasons for action.9 Although
the problem remains perplexing, neither characterization affects the
analysis of duress offered here. Whether a reasonable but wrong
agent should be excused or justified, no defense obtains unless the
defendant reasonably yielded (or believed, in the case of self-defense
or defense of others). The defense is not grounded in a psychologi-
cal, mechanism-like claim about pressure that is independent of
preexisting moral analysis about the seriousness of evils and of the
reasonableness of expectations about proper conduct.
How should the law respond to the agent who yields when a
reasonable person would not, but who claims that she was "psycho-
logically powerless" to resist the threat? I have already suggested
that if fear drives someone crazy or otherwise deprives them of
rationality (for example, they are so frightened that they literally
"cannot think"), then an excuse based on irrationality, not duress,
" In a personal communication, Peter Arenella suggests that the differences
between law-abiding citizens and offenders may be far greater than is commonly
assumed. That is, many offenders may substantially lack so many of the self-
protective variables that it might be much harder for them to fly straight. Thus,
moralistic, retributive sentiments and consequent punishment may often be
unwarranted and unfair.
Such caution before inflicting blame and punishment is salutory because our
criminal law too often imposes excessively harsh punishments, but we must also be
careful not to deprive offenders unjustifiably of the respect they deserve as
responsible moral agents.
o Kent Greenawalt, The Peiplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 COLtUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1897 (1984); see also WALLACE, supra note 22; WERTHEIMER, supra note 22.
9' See MOORE, supra note 5, at 177-83.
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is perhaps appropriate.92 Note that diminished rationality vitiates
one's usual self-protection and thus makes it harder to fly straight,
but the claim is not then mechanism or its moral analogues.
But how should we respond to the apparently rational agent who
claims that her individual psychological characteristics prevented
her from acting reasonably because the generally insufficient threat
she faced was irresistible to her? If her claim is true, how can it be
fair to blame and punish her? What is the nature of the claim? The
first response is that the claim is not about "pressure" or psychologi-
cal constraint, but about the rationality of her emotion, fear, under
the circumstances. We commonly and plausibly talk about and
judge what it is rational to feel as well as what it is rational to
believe.93 Cases of doing evil under great fear occasioned by
normatively lesser threats are good candidates for characterizing the
agent as irrational on the basis of her motivating emotions. The
second possibility is to treat the case as one of internal coercion,
although the threat is external. That is, the objective evil of the
threat is not doing the work, as it is in unproblematic duress cases.
Rather, the external threat arouses fear of internal states that
underpins the argument for excuse. I shall analyze this argument
in the next section of Part IV, but for now we should recognize that
this argument does not support standard duress cases.
In conclusion, duress should excuse, but not for the metaphori-
cal reasons we commonly adduce.
2. Internal Coercion
The more difficult issue is how to understand claims about
coercion resulting from mental abnormality-including claims about
unusual cowardice or weakness that allegedly causes a victim to yield
to an otherwise insufficient external threat. Can the objective,
moral model of coercion be applied to one-party, intrapersonal,
cases? The problem of intrapersonal involuntariness may be
characterized generally as follows: you want to do something that
you know you should not do, but you feel like you must do it
anyhow because the pain of not doing it will be unbearable. Put
another way, you experience intense and unpleasant emotion that
can only be alleviated by wrongful action. Although some positive
9 See RADDEN, supra note 56, at 133.
93 SeeJUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 41-42 (1992). See generally
RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 141-203 (1987).
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pleasure or at least the "positive" experience of "release" will
accompany the wrongdoing, the primary motivation is the avoidance
of dysphoria. 4 Now, if you do not know what you are doing or
that it is wrong, this is once again a standard rationality problem
and casts little light on inner coercion.95 Suppose, however, that
you know rationally that you should not perform the wrongful act
because you correctly believe that it is wrong, but you feel that you
cannot help yourself because it will simply be too awful not to
perform it. For example, you know that you cannot afford to lose
any more money gambling but feel that you must place that next
bet.96 Or, an agent feels overwhelmed by intense rage that can
only be alleviated by violent action. Or, a person who abuses drugs
but knows she should not, robs to obtain money for the drugs and
shoots up again because she is terrified of the pain of withdrawal.
Or, an agent desires to have sexual contact with a child, even
though the agent knows that doing so would be exploitative and
harmful. Or, you want to yield to someone who threatens you with
mild injury even though you know that it is an objectively insuffi-
cient reason to do even greater evil. Most of the classes of mental
abnormalities that involve alleged pathologies of the will-the
impulse disorders,97 drug dependence, so-called paraphilias, s and
compulsions9 9 -fit this characterization, as does the case of unrea-
' Once again, if the primary motivation is positive or pleasurable, then there is
no threat and the second criterion of coercion is absent. See supra text accompanying
note 83. For example, it is alleged that most pathological gamblers love to gamble
and that gambling is "ego-syntonic," at least until the later stages of the disorder.
Richard J. Rosenthal, Pathological Gambling, PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Feb. 1992, at 72,
73. If such were the case, internal coercion would not obtain.
9 See RADDEN, supra note 56, at 133.
See, e.g., Richard J. Rosenthal & Henry R. Lesieur, Self-Reported Withdrawal
Symptoms and Pathological Gambling, 1 AM.J. ADDICTIONS 150, 152 (1992) (noting that
many pathological gamblers report various withdrawal symptoms, such as insomnia
or headaches, when attempting to slow down or cease gambling).
" The American Psychiatric Association provides the following"essential features"
of"impulse control disorders": (1) failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation
to perform an act harmful to the self or others; (2) increasing sense of tension or
arousal before committing the act; and (3) experiencing either pleasure, gratification,
or release at the time of committing the act. See DSM-III-R, supra note 23, at 321;
DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 609.
" DSM-III-R generically defines these disorders as marked by recurrent sexual
urges and fantasies directed at nonhuman objects, suffering or humiliation of oneself
or one's partner, or children, or other nonconsenting persons. The disorder exists
only if the person has acted on these urges and fantasies or is distressed by them. See
DSM-III-R, supra note 23, at 279; DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 522-23.
Compulsions are defined as disorders marked by (1) repetitive, purposeful, and
intentional behaviors performed in response to an obsession, or according to certain
CULPABILITY AND CONTROL
sonable yielding. In many cases of these types, the agent feels a
dysphoric building of tension, anxiety, or other unpleasant effect
that seemingly can be alleviated only by doing the wrong thing. In
the case of compulsions, the repetitive increase in dysphoria can be
relentless,' 0 akin to never-ending duress.
Do the generic two-party criteria apply to the analogous one-
party case? First, make the simplifying assumptions that an agent
is not responsible for her desires and that an external threat can
sometimes arouse dreadful dysphoria. Aristotle would demur to the
first assumption, 10 ' but many would agree, especially if the desire
were considered pathological or if the agent experiences the desire
as alien to herself, as in cases of compulsive hand-washing. And let
us assume further that an agent makes every effort to avoid those
situations that elicit the problematic desire. Despite these efforts,
however, the desire arises or a dysphoric state is aroused and the
agent will presently feel much worse unless she behaves wrongly.
Although the threatened dysphoria from nonfulfillment of an
unwanted, "abnormal" desire and from the continuation of
unpleasant mental or emotional states cannot sensibly be described
as a wrongful or morally unjustified "threat," the despairing desirer
surely does not "deserve" to be threatened. Consequently, it is
reasonable to consider the threat "unjustified." (In contrast, if
positive pleasure were the primary motivation for wrongdoing,
fulfillment would be an "offer.") In sum, assume that the agent
faces an unjustifiable internal threat, however caused, and is not
responsible for having the pathological desire or other unpleasant
state, for placing herself in environments likely to elicit it, or for
otherwise failing to attempt reasonable resistance strategies.1
2
Again, the critical question is whether performing the wrongful
action to avoid the threatened or continued dysphoria is excusable.
On the moral view, if the wrong thing desired is small beans,
then it may be reasonable to do it, rather than to suffer substantial
rules or in a stereotyped fashion; (2) the behavior is designed to neutralize or to
prevent discomfort or some dreaded event or situation, but the behavior is not
realistically connected to what it is designed to neutralize or prevent; and (3) the
person recognizes that the behavior is excessive or unreasonable. See DSM-III-R, supra
note 23, at 247; DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 418.
100 See AINSLIE, supra note 42, at 205 (describing compulsions as having "coercive"
motivational force).
101 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 61, bk. III, ch. 5 (implying that our desires are
voluntary and so we alone are responsible for them).
'02 See MELE, supra note 64, at 26-29, 50-61.
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dysphoria. Suppose, for example, that the compulsive hand-
washer's desire to wash builds to a crescendo just as her spouse is
telling her something terribly important and she rudely and
insensitively leaves to go wash. The spouse would not like it, of
course, but if he has any charity in him, he would excuse her. Or,
suppose that the pedophile unlawfully possesses child pornography
as a means of gratifying his unwanted sexual urges. An excuse
might not be unthinkable. Or, suppose that an enraged, cruelly
jilted lover spews despicable epithets at the rejecting other. We
might very well forgive the cruel words. But suppose, in contrast,
that the hand-washer's crescendo of desire to wash her hands peaks
just as her spouse chokes on some food and will die without
immediate assistance. Or, suppose that the frustrated pedophile has
intercourse with a child. Or, suppose that a drug-dependent person
can obtain the money for the next fix only by committing armed
robbery or burglary. In the latter cases-the choking spouse, the
molesting pedophile, and the withdrawing drug-dependent felon-
the moral test would hold that the person must bear the dysphoria
rather than cause dreadful harmdoing
03
Although the moral analysis of two-party coercion cases appears
profitably applicable to one-party cases of "internal" coercion,'
0 4
the analysis is complicated. In the remainder of this Section, I shall
try to unpack internal coercion claims further, demonstrating that
most cases are not pure internal coercion cases of hard choice, but
instead should be analyzed as rationality problems. First, note again
that one-party coercion cases are not instances of physical compul-
sion, in which an external or internal physically irresistible cause,
such as a much stronger person or a neuromuscular reflex, moves
a person's body although the person does not intend the movement
and may even try valiantly not to perform it. In these cases a
person literally has no choice and has not "acted." In contrast, the
coerced agent has a desire/belief set that rationalizes the bodily
" See Patricia Greenspan, Unfreedom and Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10,
at 63, 71-73. Note that the subjective view would simply inquire whether the person
was psychologically capable of acting differently. The agent would be excused if she
was able to persuade that the potential dysphoria allegedly made her feel helpless in
the face of the desire, no matter how dreadful the wrongdoing and even if she had
an acceptable alternative. This point is discussed further infra text accompanying
note 130.
'o4 See Greenspan, supra note 37, at 196-99. But see CULVER & GERT, supra note
57, at 116-17 (distinguishing between one-party and two-party cases).
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movement when the agent washes to avoid dysphoria, strikes out in
rage, sexually molests a child, reaches once again for the bottle, lays
down yet another bet at the roulette wheel, or unreasonably yields
to an objectively weak threat. Because many wish to excuse at least
some people who yield to strong, allegedly pathological desires, they
analogize goal-directed, intentional actions driven by such desires to
truly involuntary movements. By this analogy they hope to
strengthen the case for excuse. Remember, however, that the use
of the words "coercion," "compulsion," "involuntary," and "irresist-
ible" in these cases is moral and metaphorical-it does not have the
literal, material definition that obtains in cases of physical compul-
sion. It is simply a loose characterization of those circumstances in
which we excuse those who behave wrongfully in response to the
unjustified threat of pathological desires or other dysphoric states.
Second, as Part II demonstrated, the internally coerced agent
acts intentionally and exercises choice when she acts to avoid
dysphoria. To hold that the agent acts unintentionally or does not
choose is confusing, loose talk that begs the important questions.
Choice can undoubtedly be substantially and wrongfully con-
strained, limiting the person's alternatives in the circumstances, but
the decision to act or not to act is nevertheless an intentional
choice, even under the most constraining circumstances. Thus,
deciding which constraints should excuse will require a moral theory
about excusing. Consider Martin Luther's claim: "Here I stand; I
can do no other." Although there was "pressure" and no "real"
alternative for Luther, he certainly chose.' Or, consider the
following case: suppose you decide to add a room with bath to your
house and entertain bids on the same plans from two contractors,
A and B, who are equally skilled, equally reputable, equally likeable,
and equally efficient. A bids $60,000; B bids $45,000. Remember
that all things are equal. Do you act intentionally and exercise a
choice when you choose B, as any rational person would? Of course
you do, although you would rightly claim, when you turned A down,
that you really had no meaningful choice. Note in this case that the
absence of meaningful choice would not allow you to claim coercion
and avoid paying B. This situation involves an offer rather than a
threat, of course, and thus fails to meet the moralized coercion
criteria, but it does demonstrate, first, that choice is involved, even
10 have used this example for years, but recently discovered while doing research
for the present Article that Galen Strawson uses the same example to make the same
point. See STRAWSON, supra note 28, at 139.
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when there is "pressure" and no "real" alternative, and second, that
the absence of meaningful choice does not per se excuse. The
internal coercion problem is not lack of intention or choice-it is
intentionally yielding to an unjustifiable choice in the absence of
acceptable alternatives.
The third general consideration about one-party cases is that the
agent's conduct in response to so-called irresistible impulses,
including impulses produced by intense emotions like rage, is in
important ways, rational-the agent acts wrongfully "on purpose" for
the perfectly rational reason that she wishes to avoid seemingly
unbearable dysphoria. In the case of some impulse disorders and
compulsions, such as kleptomania, the desire itself may seem
irrational, but satisfying the need to avoid pain is surely not irra-
tional. 0 6 Moreover, for many people affected by the so-called
paraphilias, some impulse disorders, and drug dependence, satisfy-
ing the desire produces positive pleasure as well as the avoidance of
pain, and seeking pleasure is surely a rational reason to form an
intention.1 0 7  If the motive for satisfying the desire is purely
pleasure, then there is no threat and no compulsion, no matter how
strong the desire is.
If a person's ultimate goal, like stealing for no reason, is
properly characterized as irrational, craving for it collapses into a
rationality problem once again. And, irrationality is the basis for
excusing if threatening circumstances arising from internal
circumstances prevent the agent from thinking rationally. Many of
the cases we mistakenly or loosely term "volitional" or involuntary
fall under these descriptions. Indeed, some would claim that all
cases are like this, even in the absence of obvious irrationality.
Suppose, for example, that the person is not rendered cognitively
irrational by threatening circumstances. Imagine that a person is
petrified but rational: she has her wits about her, but feels that she
must kill because she is morbidly afraid of bodily injury. Either the
morbidity of the fear is itself irrational, or the intensity of it makes
the agent unable in any meaningful sense to weigh the competing
alternatives.18 In either case, irrationality is the touchstone.
'0o See PARFIT, supra note 57, at 120-21 (using claustrophobia as his example).
107 See supra note 94. Observe, parenthetically, that in cases where the actor
satisfies the desire by wrongful conduct both to avoid dysphoria and to seek pleasure,
the test of reasonableness for yielding to the desire is complicated on either the moral
or the empirical view of internal coercion.
108 Note that if this case is treated (wrongfully) as a coercion case, the empirical
model would excuse and the moral model would not.
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Fourth, there is no defect in the will or volition, even if a person
has intense, irrational desires that cause great dysphoria. As Part II
also discussed, problems of coercion are distinct from what might
be termed "pathologies" of the will, especially if the will is conceived
as a functional, executory state. The functional mental state that
produces action successfully satisfying an intense, irrational desire
is as intact as the functional mental state that produces action
satisfying an equally intense, rational desire. The "problem," if
there is one, is either an excusable hard choice or irrationality, not
volitional defect.109
Nonetheless, there is persistent confusion in the excuse
literature between so-called volitional or will defects on the one
hand and internal coercion and irrationality problems on the other,
as explanations for why allegedly internally coerced agents should
be excused. Will defects rarely exist and most of the cases are
anyway not internal coercion cases. For example, in a recent article,
Dr. Richard Rogers cites the case of a woman suffering from major
affective disorder who, in the depths of her hopeless dysphoria,
attempts suicide and the homicide of her children to "end their
suffering.""' Although Rogers treats this case as one of defective
volition, note that her will effectively executes her general intention
to kill herself and the children. The real problem, of course, is that
the depressed mother's assumption that the childrens' suffering is
somehow indistinguishable from hers is a psychotic, gross misper-
ception of reality, as is her belief that her situation is genuinely
hopeless. Although there are clearly rational homicides and
arguably rational suicides, this case presents neither, and terming it
a volitional problem, especially the slaughter of the children,
achieves no gain in comprehension.
But we can recharacterize the case, of course. Focusing solely
on the suicide, we could treat the threat of unbearable, unending
dysphoria as meeting the first compulsion criterion, and then treat
the suicide as an acceptable alternative under the circumstances.
But most of us do not believe that suicide is the only real alterna-
tive-we know that even the most severe depressions are self-
limiting, that most respond to various treatment modalities, and
that virtually all severe depressions compromise the sufferer's ability
109 Fingarette and Hasse make this point very clearly. See FINGARETrE & HASSE,
supra note 29, at 55-65.
1' Richard Rogers, APA's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism Versus
Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCH. 840, 844 (1987).
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to think rationally about her situation. Few would claim that this
person is rational about herself, her disorder, and her future. If her
situation really was hopeless, then the case may represent an
entirely rational suicide that poses no volitional problems.
Moreover, on this recharacterization, the woman's will operated
most effectively to end her dysphoria: the bare intention to commit
the basic act that caused death itself executed the more general
intention to kill herself.
Rogers also raises the case of a person with major mania, but
once again the problem that ultimately causes legal trouble is the
person's beliefs and perceptions about herself and the world. The
manic person does not knowingly do wrong because elevated mood
somehow impels her to do so. Rather the mood disorder distorts
her perception of reality and the consequent rationality of her
practical reasoning. In any case, the will once again effectively
translates the grandiose, irrational desire/belief set into action.
Indeed, it is difficult to envision a case in which the defendant was
suffering from a severe mental disorder with marked "coercive"
features, but was substantially rational. Virtually all cases that would
justify acquittal by reason of insanity or partial responsibility
mitigation demonstrate that marked irrationality infected the
practical reasoning that motivated the criminal conduct."' Crazy
beliefs and perceptions are the touchstone. Nevertheless, the
confusion of irrationality and volitional problems persists.
The most sophisticated attempt to rescue a volitional theory that
analogizes physical compulsion to internal coercion without
collapsing into irrationality employs hierarchical theories of
motivation, such as those most famously deployed by Harry
Frankfurt."2 The central notion is that we are responsible for
actions only if they are produced by desires that we identify with or
ratify by evaluating them according to higher order desires. For
example, some argue that agents lack the ability to act differently
and do not choose to act unless they are identified with, assent to,
.. Cases of impulse disorders and related diagnoses may be exceptions, but these
are probably best characterized as cases of irrational desires. And, if there are
situations of purely impulsive, thoughtless conduct in which the agent is incapable of
any form of reflective awareness about her desires-cases that might be termed
impetuous among the normal or explosive disorder among the abnormal-these are
clearly cases of irrationality by any reasonable rationality criteria. Cf DSM-III-R, supra
note 23, at 321-22; DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 609-10 ("Intermittent Explosive Disor-
der").
1I See, e.g., FRANKFURT, supra note 35, at 11, 58, 159.
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or ratify their desires, as the hand-washer, pedophile, and drug-
dependent person presumably do not."' Although hierarchical
accounts are attractive," 4 these accounts are problematic, and the
concept of identification seems to do little work in the justification
of excuse.
As Gary Watson has argued," 5 higher order volitions, under-
stood as Frankfurt and he use the term, are just desires themselves,
and there is no reason to make them the touchstone of deliberation
or any other criterion for responsibility. 6 Moreover, what seems
to give them authority is that they are evaluative, they mark what we
consider worthwhile. But one can fail to identify with what one
values and behave in ways one does not value from a more general
standpoint. Watson argues that defining an evaluational system just
in terms of what one does without regret abandons an explanation
of self-determination that is based on identification by evaluation.
Watson concludes that the notion of identification is "elusive" and
that defining it as a type of "brute self-assertion seems totally
unsatisfactory."
1 1 7
Another difficulty with hierarchical theories of responsibility is
that ratification or identification does not do the work for which it
is designed. An intensely greedy person, who accepts greediness as
part of herself, may feel "powerless" in the face of temptation, even
if we consider these desires normal (albeit undesirable)."' By
contrast, a person with unwanted but weak pedophilic urges may
have the ability to resist temptation, even if these urges are rightly
called pathological. The identification criterion would condemn the
former and excuse the latter, but this appears to be a perverse result
that needs far more explanation. If we assume that the "identified"
113 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 14, at 74-79.
11 But see Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2256-62 (1992) (criticizing such accounts for their
individualistic emphasis and failure convincingly to resolve the alleged incompatibility
of determinism and responsibility); John M. Fischer, Responsibility and Control, in
MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY, supra note 37, at 174, 178-85.
"' See Gary Watson, Free Action and Free Will, 96 MIND 145, 149-51 (1987)
[hereinafter Watson, Free Action]. Many scholars using hierarchical accounts rely on
an earlier article by Watson that attempted to modify and thereby strengthen
Frankfurt's account. See Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL, supra note 17, at
96 [hereinafter Watson, Free Agency]. These scholars often fail to notice that Watson
is now much less sanguine about hierarchical accounts.
1' Recall that Michael Moore, Strawson, and others reject the account ofvolitions
as desires. See supra text accompanying note 28.
11 Watson, Free Action, supra note 115, at 151.
18 For a discussion of the "moneyphile," see infra text accompanying note 124.
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agent has the ability to resist, but the "unidentified" agent does not,
then the ability to resist, not identification, is doing the work and
the empirical assumption about resistance ability needs further
support.' 9 It is not immediately apparent why identification is
coterminous with the ability to resist. Nor is it apparent that a
person faced with even a dreadfully hard choice produced by her
own wanted or unwanted desires is not choosing. For example, the
American Psychiatric Association's definition of a compulsive
behavior defines it as purposeful and intentional-the agent is hardly
an automaton.1 20  Hierarchical accounts do not convincingly
disprove the claim that the analogy of psychological compulsion to
physical compulsion is metaphorical. And, finally, suggestions that
the agent has no choice beg the difficult empirical and moral
questions concerning human abilities and what the law and morality
can demand when choice is unjustifiably constrained.
t 2'
Perhaps most controversially, Nozick argues about hierarchical
accounts that the conflict between one's desires at different levels
violates a formal rule of the rationality of desires.122  One can
make conflicting first and second order desires consistent by
modifying either. To use Nozick's example, if an agent whose first
order desire is to take drugs has a second order desire not to have
such a first order desire, the agent can achieve consistency by
abandoning either the desire for drugs or the desire not to have the
desire. Indeed, it might be entirely rational to abandon the second
order desire if one believes that abandoning the desire for drugs
would be far more difficult. I conclude, in sum, that hierarchical
accounts do not provide independent reason to believe that agents
suffering from untoward internal states should be excused because
they cannot help themselves.
Fifth, an enduring mistake in analyzing one-party cases is the
belief that abnormal cognitions are somehow more coercive or
compelling than normal cognitions. An agent motivated by crazy
beliefs is classically irrational, however, and there is no need to
119 Cf. MELE,supra note 64, at 73-74 (rejecting hierarchical accounts of motivation
because they do not generate general resolution of the paradoxes of self-control).
120 See supra note 23.
2 Also, consider a person with unfortunate desires, who may have tried without
avail to change and who has finally accepted her unpleasant fate because she has no
alternative. Should this person become an enhanced candidate for moral appraisal
because she has "ratified" her desires? After all, there is no positive evaluation; there
is simply "brute acceptance" because life provides no alternative.
122 See NOZICK, supra note 57, at 141-42.
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resort to internal coercion analysis. But in any case, it is a logical
error to believe that mistaken perceptions and beliefs, whether
normally or abnormally generated, are more compelling in practical
reasoning than accurate perceptions and beliefs.1'2 The delusional-
ly mistaken belief of a person suffering from paranoia that she is
about to be attacked and must use self-defensive force is no more
"compelling" than the accurate belief of a police officer that she
must use deadly force injustifiable self-defense. Both have the same
survival desire and there is no reason to doubt that both experience
these desires with equal intensity. The unfortunate person with
paranoia is of course irrational and in appropriate cases will be
excused on that basis. The deluded agent might not have attacked
but for the crazy belief, but the problem is the irrational belief and
not lack of self-control. There is a defect in the agent that makes it
harder for her to fly straight, but it is not lack of self-control
mechanisms, unless these are defined generically to mean anything
that makes it harder to fly straight. Furthermore, if an agent simply
believed, without any apparent reason, that she had to attack an
innocent victim or suffer some inchoate, dreadful dysphoria, the
case would be clinically unlikely and one of irrationality.
Preliminary analysis of one-party cases suggests that most cases
of pure internal coercion or compulsion that fit the hard choice
model are better analyzed as irrationality cases than as hard choice
cases. Moreover, they are not volitional problem cases. If an agent
in a one-party case has trouble conforming, it is because irrationality
interferes with the ability to fly straight and not because the will is
overborne. Many would also treat cases of apparently pure hard
choice-pedophilia, kleptomania, pathological gambling, or the
coward who will commit any harm to avoid injury to self, no matter
how slight-as rationality problems, even in the absence of cognitive
irrationality, for these are cases of arguably "irrational" ends.
Nevertheless, because the irrationality claim is controversial in such
cases, let us consider the allegedly pure internal cases in more
detail. 124
12- Cf Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Ianful Dysfunction: A Conceptual Critique
of DSM-III-R's Definition of Mental Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 232, 237 (1992) (noting
that reasonable beliefs and paranoid delusions can generate similar emotional
reactions).
124 Practical concerns that may also be a reason not to adopt a hard choice analysis
for excuse in internal coercion cases will be discussed in Part V.
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How should morality and the law respond to a case of pure
internal coercion-that is, a person who uses rational but wrongful
means to avoid dysphoria threatened by arguably rational desires.
Can these cases be treated as based on mental abnormality and on
that ground as justifying a moral or legal excuse? Can these cases
ultimately be distinguished from rationality problems?
Most laypeople and many clinicians would probably treat pure
coercion cases as instances of clear-headed akrasia-that is, normal
weakness of the will-and would hold the agent fully responsible
because she does not seem sufficiently mentally abnormal. Suppose
that a generally law-abiding person is nonetheless exceptionally
greedy-a moneyphile, if you will. If this person is faced with a
tempting situation in which the theft of a large sum of money is
easily accomplished with little chance of detection, she may steal.
How do we explain this case? One possibility is that she was so
overcome by her desires that she failed to think straight about the
moral and legal consequences of what she was doing. If so, the
excuse, if any there be, is once again irrationality. If an actor "loses
control," that is, does something that she would not otherwise do,
as a result of a cognitive glitch, this is a rationality problem. The
alternative possibility is that the agent recognizes the reality of the
situation in all its moral relevance, but is somehow unable to refrain
from acting wrongly because she fears mounting dysphoria or the
like. This is the classic case of internal coercion explained by hard
choice.
Do we excuse the moneyphile? The usual answer is negative:
moneyphilia is considered a character trait rather than a disorder,
and we believe that an agent is responsible for her character and
able to maintain both cognitive rationality and self-control in the
face of the strong desires her character produces, even when
tempted directly."2 5 How is this case distinguishable, however,
from pedophilia or gambling? Simply referring to the latter as
mental disorders rather than as character traits begs the crucial
question. Are our "normal desires" up to us more than our
"abnormal/pathological desires"? We are all in large measure the
product of biological endowments and environments over which we
had no control and many of our central desires are firmly estab-
'25 See GEORGE EuIOT, ADAM BEDE 166-67 (Harcourt et al. eds, 1962) (1859)
("Why, yes, a man can't very well steal a bank-note unless the bank-note lies within
convenient reach; but he won't make us think him an honest man because he begins
to howl at the bank-note for falling in his way.").
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lished well before we reach the age of genuine, independent moral
reflection on those desires. Moreover, what reason is there to
believe that it is more difficult to learn to control abnormal desires
than normal or immoral desires126 of equal strength? And if we
try to distinguish the cases on the ground that pedophilia and
compulsive gambling desires are pathological and irrational and
moneyphilia is not-as is implied by the locution, "abnormal
desires"-then we have redefined the problem once again as a
rationality problem.
Another approach is to suggest that the desires of the pedophile
or pathological gambler are necessarily stronger than the money-
phile's desires and that nonfulfillment will produce correspondingly
greater dysphoria than in the case of the moneyphile. But this will
not work either. There is simply no scientific or clinical evidence
that "abnormal" desires are necessarily stronger than "normal"
desires and thus that abnormal desires uniquely threaten unbearable
dysphoria and produce a consequently harder choice. The
moneyphile faced with an unattended pile at the ready may feel as
much "pressure" as the pedophile unwittingly left alone with an
attractive child. An extraordinarily strong desire for power, fame,
or wealth motivates people to diverse, unseemly conduct, and for
some people, pedophilic and other allegedly abnormal urges are
mild and avoidable, even under the most devastatingly tempting
circumstances. What is the relevance of the source of the desire
except that some are "abnormal," that is, irrational, thus collapsing
the analysis into the rationality domain once more? If desires or
ends conceptually cannot be irrational per se, providing a principled
way to distinguish these cases is difficult.
A final attempt to distinguish desires that diminish responsibility
from those that do not employs the hierarchical view of motivation
discussed above, which requires for responsibility that the agent
identify with or ratify her desires according to higher order
desires.127 Although hierarchical accounts initially seem to pres-
ent promising responses to compulsive states, 128 for the reasons
given earlier-difficulties with the identification concept, with
126 Here I am assuming that one can distinguish between abnormal and immoral
desires. To the extent that one believes it is impossible rationally to desire immoral
ends, then the distinction collapses. See generally RONALD D. MILO, IMMORALITY
(1984) (discussing the typology of immorality). This point is discussed further in the
discussion of the psychopath's responsibility in Part IV.B.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 112-22.
121 See Watson, Free Action, supra note 115, at 148.
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whether failure to identify is genuinely the basis for excuse, and
with whether inconsistent desires are rational-this approach is
unlikely to solve the dilemma.
Perhaps the soundest approach is simply to define as irrational
any extreme desire that can threaten unbearable dysphoria, no
matter how rational it might be in milder forms, and to limit
internal coercion excuses to such cases. 129 Indeed, most of us
think there is something more than a little wacky about wanting
anything "too much." Now, how much is "too much" will of course
depend on the circumstances, including social conventions. An
extreme desire to end hunger in one's society is less likely to be
considered irrational than an equally extreme desire to possess the
finest collection of matchbook covers in one's neighborhood. (And,
how one tries to satisfy the desire will be judged as a matter of
instrumental rationality.)
How should we respond to cases of wanting something "too
much," cases in which the value of the good sought appears to bear
no plausible relation to the strength of the desire for it? First, are
desires that excessive appropriately characterized as rational? And
when people are motivated to act wrongfully as a result of such
extreme desires, do we believe that they are capable of rationally
weighing the situation? I do not have answers to these questions,
but my hunch is that most people would conclude that neither
extreme desire nor practical reasoning that includes such desire is
rational. And in many cases involving such extreme desires, it is
also probable that the ability to reason well in the face of the
relevant temptation will be compromised substantially.
Finally, on the moral view, how can threatened undesirable
subjective states ever justify a rational actor's wrongdoing? The
moral, objective test does not ask an empirical, phenomenological
question that requires an answer about an unknown level of ability
to refrain. The expectation of reasonableness is not a psychological
variable, but a moral standard, and we assume that all agents can
refrain from wrongful conduct, albeit some with greater difficulty
than others. Thus, if it would be unfair to require a person to
refrain from causing harm-as in the case of person who acts in
response to the threatening gunslinger-the law will excuse her even
if she is capable of refraining. Conversely, as a moral matter, we
'29 Cf. CULVER & GERT, supra note 57, at 111 (providing the criteria for volitional
ability).
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simply expect people to bear significant harms before they will be
excused for harming others. Indeed, most American jurisdictions
provide a duress defense only if the defendant had been threatened
with death or grievous bodily harm, and most provide no duress
defense to the crime of murder. The reasoning in two-party cases
is that only the most seriously harmful threats can excuse, and in
many jurisdictions no threat excuses taking a life. Understanding
why one-party, internal coercion cases should be treated differently
is obscure. Consequently, to justify excusing all but the most petty
crimes, an agent would have to demonstrate that extraordinary fear
of dysphoria drove her to unlawful conduct. There is good reason
to believe, however, that even in the most stereotypically hard one-
party choice, that of the drug addict, the choice is probably not so
hard that one could not fly straight rather than commit serious
crimes.' And, in virtually all cases in which a sufficiently intense
fear or other strong feelings support an internal hard choice excuse,
these feelings would surely result from irrational beliefs or percep-
tions or would compromise rationality to a substantial degree.
Observe that if we adopted a subjective, empirical model for
internal coercion, we would excuse anyone who persuaded us that
she acted for fear of dysphoria, even if the dysphoria did not seem
objectively intense and she committed a horrendous deed. Still,
much as some people might terribly fear even slight physical harms,
others might have similar difficulty bearing mildly unpleasant
emotions. "Pressure" is "pressure," whether its source is objectively
justifiable or not. So, the empirical model is hard put not to excuse
the genuinely fearful physical or emotional coward. One may
object, however, that if the source of the dysphoria was weak and
the need to avoid it so terrible, then the problem must be character-
ological lack of self-control. But this is simply another way of saying
the person is a coward. In either case, the agent experiences an
inability to refrain. And is the empiricist willing to hold people
responsible for their characters? How, at the age of self-reflection
and maturity, can an intense coward justly be expected upon threat
of punishment to develop the courage to fight and to conquer the
cowardice? If this expectation is unreasonable, the internal
coherence of the empirical model requires that this person must be
excused. But excusing in such cases would be a morally perverse
130 See DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 108-17 (1992) (using a hard choice
model to conclude that "addicts" are not powerless to stop using drugs).
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result based on a behavior assessment technology that we lack.
Finally, if an agent is willing to do something terrible to avoid
objectively mild sources of dysphoria, one suspects once again that
the agent's ability to weigh the alternatives rationally was impaired.
In the end, do pure coercion cases exist that require excuse?
Although I am sympathetic to claims that the rationality of desires
or ends is difficult to assess, I am finally convinced, by malignantly
circular reasoning perhaps, that it must be irrational to want to
produce unjustified harm so intensely that failure to satisfy that
desire will create sufficient dysphoria to warrant an excuse.
Moreover, in a very small class of cases, such as kleptomania or
necrophilia, the agent's goal-described as theft for no reason or
sexual desire for the dead-may simply seem unintelligible or
"inappropriate" for any rationally motivated human being.13 1 The
justification for the excuse in all these cases is then irrationality, not
hard choice. Even if clinicians routinely consider what they
conceive to be volitional problems in their clinical practice, it does
not follow that the law must adopt a conceptually misguided excuse.
As Joseph Livermore and Paul Meehl argued in theirjustly celebrat-
ed article on the virtues of M'Naghten, a morally justifiable insanity
defense based on purely cognitive considerations is feasible.1
3 2
Even if "pure" internal coercion cases provide theoretically
independent grounds for excusing, the profound conceptual
difficulties already considered and consequent assessment and
implementation problems, to be discussed in Part V, suggest great
caution before adopting, analyzing, and adjudicating these as cases
of hard choice rather than as cases of irrational action.
B. A Hard Case: Psychopathy
The traditionally-conceived psychopath is firmly in touch with
the reality of the environment, including the schedule of rewards
and punishments that the law and ordinary folk will impose for
various sorts of behavior, and is able to engage in successful formal
instrumental reasoning. The psychopath surely acts voluntarily and
"3 See RESCHER, supra note 57, at 92-106. But see generally Joyce C. Oates, "IHad
No Other Thrill or Happiness," N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 24, 1994, at 52 (implying that
for some serial killers, their deeds seemed the only means to achieve meaning or
satisfaction in life, but that for others the conduct is simply inexplicable).
1s2 SeeJoseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues ofM'Naghten, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 789 (1967), reprinted in PAUL E. MEEHL: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL PAPERS 338 (C. Anthony Anderson & Keith Gunderson eds., 1991).
CULPABILITY AND CONTROL
intentionally. Nevertheless, the psychopath lacks empathy and
conscience, traits whose absence surely predispose an actor strongly
to selfish, antisocial, and perhaps criminal conduct.3 3 The ques-
tion is whether psychopaths should be excused for their bad deeds.
There is no hint of internal coercion or defect in the will in these
cases. The psychopath "cannot help himself" or "cannot conform"
only in that he lacks important self-protective variables that would
enable him to fly straight far more easily. So, if an excuse is to
obtain, it must be that the capacities for guilt and empathy are
independent requirements of responsibility or that the rationality
requirement encompasses them. After all, can it be fair to blame
and punish someone who lacks such crucial self-protective devices,
especially because these variables are not only products of heredity
and early environment, they are also notoriously hard to acquire as
an adult if the agent lacks the right stuff to begin with.
I confess to great ambivalence about the proper moral and legal
response to the psychopath's wrongdoing. On the one hand, the
"' Although the validity of the diagnostic category has been denied and there is
much disagreement about tile modal characteristics of psychopathy, I assume for
purposes of discussion (and believe) that such people exist. The modern under-
standing of the concept begins with HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (5th ed.
rev. 1982), and the best recent, empirical work is by Robert Hare and associates. See,
e.g., Robert D. Hare et al., The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and Factor
Structure 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 338 (1990) (asserting that the revised Psychopathy
Checklist is a reliable and valid instrument for the assessment of criminal psychopathy
in male populations); Stephen D. Hart et al., Psychopathy as a Risk Markerfor Violence:
Development and Validation of a Screening Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist, in
VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 81 (John
Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER] (same). See generally HARE, supra note 63. The characteristics of the
"traditional" psychopath described in the text are not necessary criteria for the
seemingly related disorder, "Antisocial Personality Disorder," which is defined more
behaviorally by the American Psychiatric Association in DSM-III-R, supra note 23, at
342-46; DSM-IV, supra note 23, at 649-50. The correlation between "Antisocial
Personality Disorder" and instruments measuring the more traditional concept is
strong but not perfect. See Hart et al., supra, at 92-93; see also Robert D. Hare et al.,
Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, 100J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 391 (1991) (describing an alternative approach to that given by DSM-III-R
for "Antisocial Personality Disorder," namely the revised Psychopathy Checklist).
Nevertheless, a lack of conscience and empathy would surely predispose a person to
the types of antisocial conduct that are criterial for "Antisocial Personality Disorder."
But see Michael Hakeem, The Assumption that Crime Is a Product of Individual Character-
istics: A Prime Example from Psychiatty, in THEORETICAL METHODS IN CRIMINOLOGY
197, 207-10 (Robert F. Meier ed., 1985) (arguing that DSM-III's category of "Antiso-
cial Personality Disorder" is a tautological failure, but also failing to discuss the
narrower notion "psychopathy" discussed in the text or Hare's research discussed in
this note).
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psychopath knows what he is up to, what the rules are, and what will
happen to him if he is caught for breaking them. From this
vantage, the psychopath seems undoubtedly rational and many wish
to hold him fully responsible if the only claim for excuse is psychop-
athy.' On the other hand, he lacks attributes that give people
perhaps the best reasons not to harm others and thus that operate
as powerful moral, emotional, and intellectual inhibitors of
harmdoing. Viewed thusly, the psychopath seems "morally insane,"
unable successfully to reason practically about moral issues, to
include moral concerns among his reasons for action.
1
3
5
Both characterizations are correct, of course, so the question is
whether the law should adopt a standard of rationality that is "thin,"
requiring only selfish feelings, "bare" cognitive knowledge of the
world and its rules, and the ability to reason instrumentally in a
formal sense. Or, in the alternative, should the law adopt a
standard that is "thick," requiring moral content in addition. If one
adopts the former, no excuse is necessary; if the latter, some degree
of excuse, depending on the agent's degree of psychopathy, is
appropriate. I have not yet resolved this point satisfactorily for
myself, so I must be content with simply raising the issue. Finally,
" See, e.g., Pillsbury, supra note 49, at 746-47 (claiming that psychopaths are
rational and should be held responsible, unless they lack selfish feelings, which is
highly improbable); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2), which provides, for
purposes of excusing responsibility on the basis of mental disease or defect, that the
terms mental disease or defect "do not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." This section is arguably meant
to exclude psychopaths from those who can properly claim legal insanity. See MODEL
PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) § 4.01 cmt. 4. In contrast,
some have argued that the psychopath should be entitled to raise a legal insanity
claim as long as the diagnosis is not based only on repeated antisocial conduct. See,
e.g., State v. Werlein, 401 N.W.2d 848, 851 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (deriving from the
state criminal code a legislative intent "to exclude from the definition of mental
disease or defect those disorders that are manifested solely by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct").
'35 Arenella, supra note 60, at 1511 (examining whether the criminal law offers a
persuasive account of a defendant's moral culpability); Susan Wolf, Sanity and the
Metaphysics of Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW
ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 46. Wolf writes that
these characters are less than fully sane. Since [they] lack the ability to
know right from wrong, they are unable to revise their characters on the
basis of right and wrong, and so their deep selves lack the resources and the
reasons that might have served as a basis for self-correction.
Id. at 58. In other words they are morally irrational in that they lack the ability
accurately to reason morally. See alsoJean Hampton, Mens Rea, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Spring 1990, at 1, 14-15 (arguing that "knowledge of the [moral prescription's]
authority is central to our finding [agents] at fault").
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accepting an excuse for the psychopath does not put society on a
slippery slope that will inevitably lead to the claim that none of us
is responsible for what we do because none of us is responsible for
who we are. Once again, the predicates for responsibility are the
existence of certain attributes such as rationality and the lack of
hard choice, not the existence of causation. We are all caused, but
we are not all irrational, faced with hard choices, or perhaps,
lacking any moral sense.
A final, consequential point about excusing psychopaths might
tip the moral balance. Excused psychopaths would be preventively
committed for extraordinarily long periods of time for two reasons:
psychopathy is refractory to change, and if personality alterations
that would warrant release did seem to occur, we would have special
reason to be unsure whether a psychopath's seeming personality
changes were genuine or feigned. An excuse might be the warrant
for lifelong incarceration, even if the crime charged were one that
entailed only moderate or short prison terms." 6 Whether lengthy
quasi-criminal commitment for psychopaths is desirable depends on
one's view of the balance between the virtues of incarceration for
public safety and the defects of deprivations of liberty. But this
outcome would surely obtain if the criminal law excused psycho-
paths.
C. Dynamic Unconscious Motivation and Control" 7
Adherents of psychodynamic psychological theories claim that
much of human behavior is caused by psychological motives that are
dynamically unconscious, that is, prevented from reaching aware-
ness because recognition of them would provoke dreadful anxiety
"3 The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment permits involuntary commitment of an insanity acquittee for a period
longer than the acquittee might have served in prison if convicted. See Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) ("There simply is no necessary correlation
between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery. The length
of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the
purposes of his commitment."). The psychopath would surely have to be released if
he were no longer dangerous, see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784, 1788-89
(1992) (noting that post-insanity acquittal commitment is justified only if the person
is both disordered and dangerous, and citingJones, 463 U.S. at 356, 368-69), but, as
noted in the text, this would be uniquely hard to determine about a psychopath.
3 I chose to write on this topic because it is another on which Michael Moore has
written influentially and taught me much. See Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1563 (1980) (questioning whether the existence of
unconscious mental states should alter moral or legal assessments of responsibility).
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and other unpleasant feelings. An example of such motivation
might be the bank robber who robs to pay gambling debts, but who
executes his crimes in a manner that virtually insures that he will be
caught. A psychodynamic formulation of the causes of his action
might include the hypothesis that the robber unconsciously feels
unworthy and guilty and desires, without being aware of it, of
course, to be punished. As a result, and again without being aware
of it, he commits his robberies in an unnecessarily incompetent
manner, guaranteeing capture, conviction, and punishment.
According to the dynamicist, such unconscious motivation is
ubiquitous; there is, so to speak, a "shadow" system of practical
reasoning of varying rationality that accompanies and influences our
conscious motivation.
Assuming the validity of such hypotheses, what is their bearing
on control excuses?,3 8 First note that dynamically unconscious
motivation does not negate intention or choice. The hapless bank
robber may not have been aware of the "real" reason he robbed the
bank, but he surely chose to rob it and did so intentionally.
Moreover, he was fully conscious in the legal sense because he did
not rob during a dissociative state. If psychodynamic motivation
produces a lack of intention in some hard to fathom manner or,
more plausibly but rarely, it causes a dissociative state, then the
absence of mens rea or dissociation is doing the work."3 9
'" There is reason to have more than reasonable doubts about the validity of such
assumptions. See ADOLF GRONBAUM, VALIDATION IN THE CLINICAL THEORY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 3 (1993)
(challenging Freud's and post-Freudians' "clinical methods of validating causal
inferences"); StephenJ. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts
and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971,983-1018 (1982) (arguing that psychodynamic
theory does not provide scientifically validated causal accounts for behavior and that
no means exist to construct reliable and valid formulations for behavior). For the
more sanguine view, see RichardJ. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental
Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L.
REV. 427,433-35 (1980) (arguing that speculation and imprecision regarding inquiries
into mental aberrations are not persuasive reasons for courts to reject them).
Treatment of the relation between dynamically unconscious motivation and
responsibility in the depth it deserves goes far beyond the scope of this chapter, but
a brief sketch of the answer is possible. For a far fuller treatment, see the sources
cited above in this note. For a recent attempt to integrate dynamic and cognitive
accounts of unconscious mental processes, see Mick Power & Chris R. Brewin, From
Freud to Cognitive Science: A Contemporaty Account of the Unconscious, 30 BRIT. J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 289, 302-07 (1991).
"' For a discussion of the reasons to excuse dissociated agents, see infra part IV.D.
In contrast, the presence of dynamic motivation does not per se negate mens rea,
and, in virtually all cases, claims that particular unconscious motivation in fact
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Should dynamically unconscious motivation have excusing force?
Here are two theories that might support such an excuse. The first
is that an agent who is unaware of the "real" reason for conduct is
not rational; the second is that dynamic unconscious motivation
somehow compels the agent to perform the conduct so motivated.
Consider our sad bank robber again. He was quite consciously
rational: he knew the relevant facts about the world and his
conscious reason for robbing the bank-to obtain needed money--
was certainly rational, if not laudable. Moreover, his will translated
his desires into action. Is knowing the entire set of causes for one's
behavior necessary for responsibility? All of us almost always lack
full awareness of the present variables causally influencing us,
whether they are of the dynamic type or not.140 If the presence
of dynamically unconscious causes or other unperceived causes
negated responsibility, no one would ever be responsible because
such causes are always operative. Only if dynamically unconscious
motives were distinguishable for these purposes would this theory
have plausibility. But because dynamic motivation is ubiquitous, we
would then need a further theory and method for distinguishing
unconscious motives that render the consciously rational agent
actually irrational from unconscious motives that did not have this
effect. For example, we might try to distinguish rational and
irrational unconscious motivation. Even if this were possible, which
is entirely a tooth fairy hypothesis, the excuse would be irrationality,
not lack of control, except in the extended sense that irrationality
makes flying straight harder.
Let us try one more irrationality approach to excusing the
robber. He performed the robbery in a way calculated to fail to
satisfy his conscious desire for money. How could he have messed
up so badly unless he formed conscious irrational beliefs, say based
on inaccurate perceptions, about the circumstances of the robbery?
Such an account is plausible, and psychodynamic psychological
negated mens rea will be simply incredible. No story about unconscious motivation,
no matter how clinically or scientifically credible, should or could convince us that an
armed person who walks into a bank and demands money from a teller at gunpoint
lacks the mens rea for bank robbery.
1
0 See RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 205-09 (1980) (describing subjects' inability to
generate accurate causal explanations of themselves and their behavior); Richard
Nisbett & Timothy Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231, 24246 (1977) (asserting that individuals are
sometimes unaware of stimuli that significantly influence physical responses).
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evidence might be used to buttress the claim that the robber was
"unable" to form true beliefs. As always assuming the validity of the
entire account, we must face again the problem of distinguishing
incompetence from an inability to perceive accurately, to form true
beliefs, and to reason well-in brief, to behave rationally. If this
were possible, the excuse would be classically conscious irrationality.
Let us turn to the alternative, compulsion theory. How might
dynamically unconscious causes "compel" conduct? Why are
dynamically unconscious causes any more compelling than the
other, myriad causes of behavior of which we are unaware? Causes,
even if they are unconscious, are not excuses. Of course, it is
arguable that self-awareness about one's "true" motives, in addition
to self-awareness about what one is consciously doing, makes it
easier to control conduct. But empirical research suggests that
becoming aware of dynamically unconscious motives, that is,
achieving "insight" into repressed psychological contents, does not
help people to change,14 1 producing doubt about this argument.
And, the argument is not about hard choice, but about another
attribute, self-awareness, that may be self-protective. Assuming that
awareness of one's motives is self-protective, should lack of such
awareness excuse in general or in the case of (some? which?)
dynamic motives? If so, it would excuse because we believe that the
self-protective variable is so important that lacking it makes it too
difficult to fly straight. But there is no reason to believe this in
general or in the case of dynamic motivation in particular. The
"compulsion theory," if supportable at all, reduces to a standard
"hard to fly straight" theory, much akin to irrationality claims. I
conclude that as long as the agent is consciously rational and not
constrained by a perceived, blameless hard choice, justification for
an excuse is lacking.
141 For example, the lack of difference in therapeutic outcome that different
psychotherapies produce suggests that "insight" is not the mechanism of change in
those psychotherapies that rely on insight. See MARY L. SMITH ET AL., THE BENEFITS
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 85-126 (1980) (evaluating the efficacy of different types of
psychotherapies); see also GRONBAUM, supra note 138, at 167-228 (discussing the lack
of probative evidence for psychoanalytic theory and therapy). This point must be
distinguished, however, from the possible value of introspection for understanding
self-conceptions that are not dynamically unconscious. See, e.g.,J. Gregory Hixon &
William B. Swann, Jr., When Does Introspection Bear Fruit? Self-Reflection, Self-interes4
and Interpersonal Choices, 64J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (1993) (arguing that
self-reflection may foster self-insight).
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D. At Action's Border: Dissociative States
Dissociative states pose vexing problems for understanding
human action and its relation to culpability. Although conscious-
ness is always partial,"' these states involve a division, distur-
bance, or alteration in self-consciousness that ranges along a
continuum from normal to severe. 4 ' Normal examples might be
"highway hypnosis," the phenomenon of driving quite competently
for some distance without, apparently, either concurrent self-
consciousness or later memory of having done so. Pathological
examples include fugue states, sleepwalking, or episodes of
depersonalization, in which a person becomes detached from the
usual sense of self and may feel like an automaton. Intense
emotions like rage or severe stress can trigger such states, which,
again, can range along a continuum of severity. Automatism or
unconsciousness is the standard criminal law doctrine that responds
to such states when they are sufficiently severe to warrant exemp-
tion from responsibility.
44
Should these doctrines be understood as negations of a
voluntary act or as affirmative defenses that excuse? 145  On the
one hand, the dissociated defendant has been able successfully to
engage in conduct demonstrating accurate understanding of the
environment and goal-directedness, suggesting that the bodily
movements are intentional actions. 14' These are certainly not
"' See Ernest R. Hilgard, Divided Consciousness and Dissociation, 1 CONSCIOUSNESS
& COGNITION 16, 16 (1993). See generally OWEN FLANAGAN, CONSCIOUSNESS
RECONSIDERED 153-75 (1992) (defending William James's conception of stream of
consciousness).
"4 See David Spiegel & Etzel Cardefia, Disintegrated Experience: The Dissociative
Disorders Revisited, 100J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 366 (1991).
... The defense of legal unconsciousness, which implies no voluntary act, should
be distinguished from the psychodynamic use of "unconscious," discussed supra part
IV.C., which has no necessary implications for excuse and rarely negates an allegation
of a voluntary act, but which is sometimes confused with the legal doctrine. See
United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 906 (3rd Cir. 1987) (succumbing to the
confusion, but reaching the right result nonetheless).
' For a good discussion of Anglo-American law's ambivalence, see ROBERT F.
SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 71-85 (1991). Because everyone agrees that severely
dissociated agents should be exempted from responsibility on one of the two theories,
allegedly "practical" lawyers may wonder why it makes a difference. Here are three
reasons: it is theoretically important and interesting; the allocation of the burden of
persuasion is affected; there may be substantial differences in the post-acquittal
treatment of the agent.
146 Dissociative states are often followed by amnesia, but later amnesia does not
necessarily entail that the agent lacked awareness or full intentionality during the
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cases of reflex or physically compelled movement. Nor are they
cases of random bodily movements: some mental state is directing
the bodily movements quite effectively. Consider the case of Huey
Newton. After becoming dissociated as a result of the trauma of
being shot in the abdomen in a conflict with police officers, Newton
was able to wrest a gun from one of his attackers, to shoot one, to
run away, and finally, to go to the emergency room of a nearby
hospital. 4 7 On the other hand, in dissociative states, conscious-
ness is not fully integrated because the normal ability self-conscious-
ly to observe oneself, to be aware of and monitor oneself, is missing
or severely diminished. The self-protective variable of self-awareness
seems crucial because it enables us to perceive our conduct and to
behave more adaptively by correcting ourselves. In moral terms, the
self-awareness operates as a censor or self-inhibitor: its absence
makes it hard to fly straight by facilitating "unthinkingly" immoral
behavior.14 For example, intoxication has the effect of "weaken-
ing control" because it inhibits self-observation and censorship.
Dissociated agents that nonculpably and substantially lack self-
protective self-consciousness should not be held responsible, but is
the reason a theory of act negation or excuse?'4 9 Is action lacking
because volition is absent, or is the agent unable to fly straight
because irrationality interferes?
Michael Moore suggests that dissociated bodily movements are
not voluntary acts because, although "complex routines requiring
perception and readjustment in order to reach certain goals" are
performed, "the execution is not done by the conscious will, for the
conscious will is 'elsewhere. ,'150 For Moore, then, these are genuine-
ly cases of volitional defect. I am undecided about this issue.
Because Moore standardly presents the strongest possible case for
any position he adopts, let us examine his claim in detail, beginning
with a brief reconstruction of it that addresses his view of the
relation of morality, responsibility, action, volition, personhood, and
conduct. One may be fully aware of conduct and later amnestic, and dissociated
conduct may or may not be followed by amnesia.
14 See People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398-401 (Ct. App. 1970).
148 Psychoanalytic theory postulates that these two functions of consciousness are
superego functions, but one need not adhere to Freud's theoretical structural model
of the mind to recognize the existence and importance of these functions.
149 For the argument that voluntariness can be treated as part of the mens rea
requirement, as well as of the act, see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 11-15 (2d ed. 1961).
"o MOORE, supra note 5, at 257 (latter emphasis added).
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consciousness. At the risk of some oversimplification, I believe the
Moorean view can be expressed by the following six, related
propositions, each of which he defends: (1) Moral responsibility is
an attribute of persons and not of subpersonal agencies and non-
personal things;' (2) It is the person's choice to do wrong that
makes the person responsible;'5 2 (3) Only human actions express
the choices of persons; 5 3 (4) Human action requires functional
states called volitions, which are nonactional, bare intentions that
execute more general desires, beliefs, and intentions by causing the
basic bodily movements that satisfy the more general mental
states; 5 4 (5) Volitions are true mental states of "whole" persons
and not subpersonal functional states;5 5 and (6) Personhood and
action exist only if consciousness is present.
156
Moore is surely right that action, personhood, and responsibility
all require consciousness, but what kind and how much? Moore
defines "consciousness" as the "kind of awareness we have as an
experience. " 15  In Law and Psychiatry, Moore offers a more
expansive definition: one is conscious of something if the agent has
the ability to identify her own mental states and feelings based on
special, nonobservational knowledge, termed "privileged acc-
ess."' 5 8 The consciousness required is not stream-of-consciousness
concurrent awareness, however. The voluntarily acting agent need
not be actually aware of the bare intention to perform the basic act
that will satisfy the belief/desire set. For example, habitual and
other "unthinking" acts are executed by volitions. But awareness of
one's volitions must be either easily accessible from the pre-
conscious or recapturable in principle from the dynamic uncon-
scious.'59 "Accessibility" appears to be what Moore means by "the
ability" to know one's own mental states in the special way con-
sciousness requires.
As Moore recognizes, responsibility attribution would be unfair
(and perhaps inefficient) if an agent's lack of self-consciousness
5 See id. at 51, 151.
1 See id. at 51-52.
5 See id. at 51.
154 See id. at 135-55.
15 See id. at 132-33.
'-6 See id. at 151-55.
157 Id. at 151.
'5 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
128-29 (1984).
'59 See MOORE, supra note 5, at 51-52.
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makes it unduly difficult not to violate moral norms; it is fair to
deem harmdoing immoral only if harmdoers have the ability to fly
straight. 160 But exempting the agent from responsibility could
result either from negation of the act requirement or from an
excuse. That dissociated agents cannot fairly be held responsible
does not entail that self-consciousness, as Moore defined it, is a
criterion for action. That needs to be defined independently, unless
action as a natural kind is partly defined by moral norms, which
seems implausible.1"' I believe, however, that Moore does not
adequately defend why the ability to be aware of one's volitions in
the way he posits is required for action or personhood, nor does he
indicate how much consciousness is necessary. It is possible that
unconscious agents are not responsible, but are nonetheless acting
persons. If a "thinner" conception of the consciousness required
for action is possible, then a normative choice between the two
based on nonaction grounds is what morality and the law require.
Or, in the alternative, the possibility of a thinner account suggests
that the definition of action is instinct with moral norms. To
demonstrate that a thinner conception is quite possible, I shall
reject Moore's challenge to "come up with some alternative theory
about the essence of actions, "162 and shall instead use his own
theory.
Consider the sleepwalker, a classically dissociated, "unconscious"
agent. As Moore admits, the agent performs "complex routines
requiring perception and readjustment in order to reach certain
goals."' 63 The sleepwalker is substantially aware of herself and of
her relationship to the environment. Accurate perception and
feedback loops to guide behavior are present. Most important, as
Moore recognizes, the movements of the unconscious agent that
'6o See id. at 48-49.
161 Moore cites three clues to why human action is a natural kind: our first-person
awareness of active control, our "actish" phenomenal feel; our sense that there is a
difference between the actions and mere movements of others; and, our belief that
the difference between actions and movements is a keystone to our sense of ourselves
and to our morality and law. See id. at 134-35. Now, unconscious agents may lack
"actish feel," but maybe they (or some of them) do not. Many conscious agents also
lack it, and this feel is anyway only a clue to, not a criterion of, action. The second
clue is obscure when applied to unconscious agents, and the third states only that
action is distinct from movement and does not define the criteria for action. As I
shall argue, one can fully accept the importance of the distinction, but adopt a
"thinner" conception of action.
162 Id. at 255.
163 Id. at 257.
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cause harms appear to execute more general intentions. After all,
it is implausible that the harms done are random goals: they must
express the agent's individual desires and beliefs. Some sleepwalk-
ers raid the refrigerator and some, like Ms. Cogdon, 16 4 axe-
bludgeon their children to death. To execute a general intention
requires that the agent must be aware at some level of the intention
that she is trying to execute. So, why isn't the state that executes
the sleepwalker's more general intentions a volition? Why isn't the
quite substantial awareness of the sleepwalker enough?
Moore acknowledges that the sleepwalker's functional executory
state is "volition-like," 165 is a less-than-full "volition,"166 and does
cause "just those movements to take place that would achieve the
objects of one's desire and general intentions .... which is why
[unconscious movements] look so much like actions."167  He
denies "full" volition because, apparently, the executory state is not
of the "whole" person: "[i]t may well be that subpersonal agencies
within us are achieving quite complex functions in these ... kinds
of cases."168 This speculation is consistent with Moore's stipu-
lative definition of volition as being a state of the "whole" person,
but what evidence is there for it? What naturalistic account of the
type Moore favors would suggest that subpersonal proto-actions are
another natural kind or that nature has endowed us with functional
subpersonal bare intentions to execute more general but still
subpersonal intentions?'
6 9
Moore contends that to "verify" whether a volition is a true
mental state of the "whole" person rather than a metaphor for a
subpersonal mental-state-like routine, one examines the evidence
" For a discussion of the Cogdon case, see SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 193-95 (5th
ed. 1989). Moore also discusses the case. See MOORE, supra note 5, at 249.
' MOORE, supra note 5, at 257.
16 Id. at 258.
167 Id.
" Id. at 257. I take up below Michael Moore's other answer, which is that
unconscious intentions do not perform the other essential volitional function-
resolving conflict.
169 Consciousness is so poorly understood conceptually and scientifically that it
seems unduly optimistic to base important moral and legal questions on speculation
about allegedly naturalizable psychological structures and functions. See supra note
161 and infra note 186. Compare DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED
(1991) with FLANAGAN, supra note 142 (agreeing that consciousness is a natural
phenomenon worthy of investigation, but disagreeing about its nature). For a
description and analysis of the checkered history of the study of consciousness, see
FLANAGAN, supra note 142, at 1-20.
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from phenomenology and behavior. The sleepwalker's behavior
strongly suggests that a true intention caused the goal-directed
bodily movements. Now the sleepwalker cannot tell you about her
phenomenology while she is dissociated, but neither can the
admittedly volitional person performing habitual action on
"automatic." It does not seem at all metaphorical to suggest that
the sleepwalker's intentions are those of a whole person, even
though she is not fully self-aware of them on the occasion. The
unconscious agent's behavior is simply too "actish," too complex,
too goal-directed, too dependent on awareness of self and environ-
ment, to claim that the agent's movements lack the essential
qualities of actions. Dissociated action differs from consciously
integrated action in important ways, but it is more parsimonious to
think that both are essentially actions.
Moore has two, complementary answers to arguments that
dissociated movements are actions: (1) "[c]onsciousness seems essen-
tial as part of our self-boundaries, so that if we (our conscious selves)
are [unconscious], then we don't will anything";70 (2) volitions
cannot perform their "resolving" function unless they are "respon-
sive to all (or at least a fair sample) of what one desires, believes,
and intends," and unconsciousness prevents such responsive-
ness. 17 ' The first argument is attractively derived from common
ways of speaking, but as Moore always hastens to remind us,
ordinary speech can mislead. Perhaps it does so here. Let us do a
Moorean thought experiment about what emotional reactions a
properly moral agent would and should have if, like Ms. Cogdon,
while sleepwalking, she ever so effectively axe-bludgeoned her
daughter to death. 172 She could say colloquially that she didn't do
it and Moore would support her theoretically: because she was
unconscious, she did not will her daughter's death. But should she
feel guilty as well as enormously sad and regretful? She must
understand, as do we, that murderous intentions powerful enough
to be executed were part of her psyche. Isn't some feeling of guilt
appropriate? But why should she feel appropriately guilty if she
didn't do it? Doesn't this suggest that she did do it in some
170 MOORE, supra note 5, at 258 (first emphasis added).
171 Id. In accord with the second argument is SCHOPP, supra note 145, at 136-49
(expanding the argument using Dretske's theory of action).
17 Moore famously uses thought experiments about worthy emotions to justify a
retributive theory of punishment. See Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution, supra note
10, at 212-16.
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important way? Consciousness does seem part of our self-boundaries
and it may be harder to fly straight if one is not fully conscious of
one's self, but this does not entail that the unconscious agent's
movements are not actions. This claim, even if correct, is as
consistent with excuse as with act negation.
The second claim is even more promising because an unpacked
account of the causation of action drives it. Nevertheless, accepting
the "resolving function" argument does not necessarily entail
negating action and, as a practical matter, I fear that this argument
may prove too much. 173 First, I am not sure that there is always
conflict to be resolved when action occurs. Cases surely exist in
which only one unproblematic action option presents itself in an
immediate way. Robert Schopp provides a helpful example of an
agent who is cold, wants to be warm by putting on a nearby sweater,
and does so.1 4  Although other opportunities for action were
available and there were opportunity costs involved in donning the
sweater, it is trivially true to the vanishing point that "conflict" is
"resolved" in this case. Thus, it is not certain that resolving conflict
is an essential function involved in the causation of all action.
On the other hand, virtually all desires to cause harm will arouse
conflict in nonpsychopathic agents because knowledge that harm
will be done is virtually always a good reason not to implement one's
desires. According to Moore, volitions cannot resolve unless they
are responsive to a "fair sample" of what other beliefs, desires, and
intentions the agent possesses. 17  Robert Schopp argues some-
what differently:
the actor who selects an action-plan in a state of impaired
consciousness acts without the benefit of the causal force that
would ordinarily be exerted by certain wants and beliefs that
constitute reasons for acting in a certain manner .... [W]ants,
beliefs, and decisions would produce actions, but they would not
do so in the manner of ordinary human activity because the full
array of background wants and beliefs would not be available to
1 In the course of making the second argument, Moore says that, "volitions are
part of the hierarchy of bare intentions that resolve, all things considered, what to do
now." MOORE, supra note 5, at 258 (referring to the discussion in chapter 6, at 137-
49). This is a bit perplexing, however, because his earlier discussion of the
inevitability of conflict and volition's resolving function does not include discussion
of hierarchies of intentions or of how hierarchies would work. It is devoted to
proving, quite successfully, that the resolving function is an intention, rather than a
desire or belief. I await the next book for elucidation.
171 See SCHOPP, supra note 145, at 115.
175 MOORE, supra note 5, at 258.
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the reasoner during the process of deliberation.... Deprivation
of access to these wants and beliefs distorts the causal process by
which the actor's mental states cause his selection of an action-
plan, and therefore his behavior is not produced by his effort and
determination in the manner of ordinary action.
17 6
Both agree that impaired consciousness blocks access to the psychic
materials ordinarily available to help the agent deliberate about
what to do when conflict is present. The agent nonculpably does
not have the usual self-protective access to the reasons not to cause
harm. To use Moore's phrase, they have been "sealed off,"1 " and
the agent will consequently have trouble flying straight. Exemption
from responsibility is surely plausible, but once again the justifica-
tion is as consistent with excuse as with act negation. Moore claims
that access is necessary to permit volitions to perform their
resolving function and that action is absent without the operation
of this function. 17 Robert Schopp, in contrast, seems to suggest
that action occurs, but that it is abnormally caused.
17 1
First, note how normative both accounts are. How much is a
fair sample? How much of the background wants and beliefs must
be available? Determining the right amount will partly and perhaps
entirely depend on moral norms. More importantly, the dissociated
agent is not "paralyzed" by conflict. One possibility in situations of
conflict is that the agent does nothing, is still, does no act at all
because the concluding all-out propositional attitude simply cannot
resolve the conflict. In contrast, the dissociated agent performs
complex routines that appear to execute more general intentions.
Moreover, there are always choices about conflicting means and the
resolving function seems quite up to this task. For example, Ms.
Cogdon might have performed the complex action of killing her
daughter by any number of means, each of which had opportunity
costs, yet all the choices were resolved by a concluding choice to
axe-bludgeon. In a more complex case, say the Huey Newton
example, it appears even more implausible to believe that the
resolving function was not doing its work as Newton engaged in the
extended course of conduct that killed the police officer and that
concluded with Newton's arrival in a hospital emergency room.
Finally, the countervailing considerations are not obliterated, but
176 SCHOPP, supra note 145, at 148-49 (emphasis added).
177 MOORE, supra note 5, at 258.
178 See id.
17 See SCHOPP, supra note 145, at 149, 152.
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simply out of concurrent awareness. It does not seem implausible
to characterize dissociation cases as ones in which conflict was
resolved, albeit on "thin" grounds. Why isn't this enough functional
conflict resolution for action?
I believe that to decide whether dissociation negates action or
excuses, psychopathy may provide a better analogy than the patellar
reflex. The dissociated agent presumably has the usual countervail-
ing reasons rumbling around somewhere in the psyche, whereas the
psychopath, who uncontroversially acts, never has these reasons
available at any level. Psychopaths are thus essentially "thin" moral
agents. Moreover, if psychopaths have diminished ability to learn
from previous punishment, they also lack the capacity to use
ordinary prudential considerations to block harmdoing. If psychop-
athy warrants exemption from responsibility, it is primarily because
the psychopath is "morally insane," not capable of moral rationality,
and to a lesser extent, perhaps, incapable of prudential rationality.
The dissociated agent has moral reasons blocked off and, perhaps,
prudential reasons too, although the Newton case gives one pause
about the latter. In sum, if we justifiably believe that the morally
"thin" psychopath acts, rather than claim that it is simply Ms.
Cogdon's body and not Ms. Cogdon who killed her daughter, it
seems more plausible to say that it was a "thin" version of Ms.
Gogdon's ordinary self who killed.
I also fear that the resolving function argument proves too much
because it would obliterate action in a substantial array of cases in
which our best considered judgment is that action surely occurred.
Many crimes against the person are crimes of "passion," committed
in heightened emotional states, such as fear and rage, that may seal
off access to the ordinary desires, beliefs, and intentions that permit
volitions to resolve the inevitable conflict by being properly
responsive to those background factors. Sometimes agents may be
characteristically prone to such untoward emotional states and yet
do nothing to try to master them or to avoid situations in which
they are aroused. In many other cases, however, environmental
stimuli may "sneak up" on the well-motivated agent, or the agent's
ability to master untoward emotions on the occasion may be
reduced by fatigue and other variables. An enraged, jealous agent
who discovers spousal infidelity and kills immediately, in the heat
of passion, may be as unable to have access to a fair sample of
wants, beliefs, and desires as Ms. Cogdon was. Or, a grieving
person who kills immediately in response to lesser provocation, but
16491994]
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in a state of extreme emotional disturbance, may also be disabled
from normal action causation.
On Moore's account, action is plausibly lacking in these cases.
Yet, at most, the law (and ordinary morality) responds to these cases
with a "partial excuse," such as the provocation/passion doctrine
that reduces intentional killings from murder to voluntary man-
slaughter or the Model Penal Code's even more forgiving "extreme
emotional disturbance" doctrine. 80  The law seems right in
general, but I would argue that it does not go far enough. Action
is present, but in some cases there is sufficiently extreme emotional
disturbance to warrant outright acquittal, as in standard cases of
extreme dissociation.' 8 ' In less extreme cases, including less
extreme dissociation, the most appropriate response is a partial
excuse. For example, sleepwalking cases may require outright
acquittal or partial excuse, depending on facts we might learn about
sleepwalking in general and about a particular sleepwalking
defendant. There is no reason to believe that all sleepwalkers are
dissociated to the same degree. For example, if we discovered that
Ms. Cogdon was a "light" sleepwalker, might it not be appropriate
to suggest that she killed in a state of extreme emotional distur-
bance and therefore should be convicted of a lesser homicide crime?
To conclude discussion of Moore's account of unconsciousness,
consider his definition of consciousness: a disposition or ability to
have access to the preconscious or to recapture dynamically
unconscious contents. 8 2 Do dissociated agents have this ability?
Moore assumes, it appears, that they do not, because he believes
that unconscious agents do not act. The truth is uncertain, however.
Most dissociation cases, such as sleepwalking and fugue states
generally, surely involve dynamically unconscious states, whether
caused by the panoply of psychodynamic explanations or others.
According to Moore, mental states must be recapturable only in
principle, however difficult that may be, to establish that they are
the person's.' 3 And, all that needs to be recaptured is the agent's
general intention to kill, assault, or the like, because, as Moore
sensibly notes, "conscious awareness ... has better things to do
'80 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b).
18, See StephenJ. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 36 (1984).
182 See MOORE, supra note 5, at 151-52.
11 See id. at 152.
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than be squandered on the details of motor movement."184 There
is no reason to believe that unconscious agents might not recapture
their general intentions if exposed to various forms of psychological
methods, perhaps including soul-searching. Ms. Cogdon and Huey
Newton surely could in principle recapture their homicidal
intentions. Even if dissociation is dynamically produced in the same
way in different agents, remember that similarly dissociated agents
will not behave the same. Sleepwalking refrigerator raiders and
sleepwalking axe-bludgeoners have very different, preexisting
general intentions that were available to be executed and that are
in principle recapturable. On Moore's own account, unconscious
agents may act.
Despite all the foregoing cautions about the claim that uncon-
scious agents are blameless because they do not act, I am still
undecided." 5 It is a hard, close case that I do not think can be
decided by a natural kind theory of action, which is in principle
naturalizable and divorced from normative, moral considerations.
Because the moral case is so close and uncertain, and despite the
risk of undermining the moral importance of the act requirement,
I am inclined to shift to consequential morality and for practical
reasons to treat these cases as raising claims of affirmative defense.
First, the outcome in either case is exemption from responsibility
and outright acquittal, unless the crime charged includes a lesser,
negligence crime. But negligence convictions are not appropriate
because it is unreasonable to treat the severely dissociated person
as capable of behaving as a reasonable person."8 6 The defendant
who acted in a dissociated state is more like a legally insane actor
than like an actor who harms as a result of a reflex movement or
than like a rational defendant who made a mistake of fact that
negated mens rea. In any case then, substantial injustice will not
occur if dissociated defendants are acquitted by virtue of an
affirmative defense rather than by act negation. Second, claims of
dissociation are difficult to establish, easy to fake, 8 7 and may be
' Id. at 153.
' Cf Bernard Williams, The Adus Reus of Dr. Caligari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661,
1672-73 (1994) (concluding that dissociated agents do act).
186 Cf H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 152-54 (1968) (arguing that
it is just to punish negligence only if the defendant was capable of behaving
reasonably).
117 Consider the dispute about whether the most exotic form of dissociative
disorder, multiple personality, exists at all. See Harold Merskey, The Manufacture of
Personalities: The Production of Multiple Personality Disorder, 160 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
1994] 1651
1652 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1587
easy to raise in common cases of dangerous, violent actors whose
conduct is touched off by rage and other strong emotions.
Consequently, there are many reasons to place the burden of
production and perhaps also the burden of persuasion on the
defendant: justifiable acquittal will be rare, the defendant has the
best access to the necessary evidence, and public safety may be
unduly compromised by wrongful acquittals.
E. Deprivation or "Rotten Social Background"
Many claim that people who have suffered terrible lives or who
have been brought up in seemingly criminogenic environments
cannot help themselves when they offend and should not be blamed
and punished. The question this claim raises is why a history of
emotional or other deprivation provides an independent ground for
a control excuse. Some argue that deprived offenders lack free will,
cannot help themselves, or have no choice, 188 but as we have seen,
these locutions are usually just conclusions or proxies for more
extended arguments that need to be unpacked. Let us address the
possibilities.
189
If conditions of extreme deprivation require offending to save
life, say stealing to prevent starvation, then the agent is clearly
justified and no control excuse is necessary. Many claim that
deprivation can nonculpably cause irrationality, can drive people
crazy.' If this occurs, however, irrationality and not internal
327,334-39 (1992) (arguing that a diagnosis of multiple personality disorder ("MPD")
may be a result of "artificial production" and represents a "misdirection of effort").
But see Dorothy 0. Lewis & Jennifer S. Bard, Multiple Personality and Forensic Issues,
14 PSYCHIATRIC CLINIcs N. AM. 741, 755 (1991) (suggesting that MPD is more highly
prevalent amongst criminal offenders than commonly thought but is often mistaken
for antisocial personality disorders); Elyn R. Saks, Does Multiple Personality Disorder
Exist? The Beliefs, the Data, and the Law, 17 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 43, 45-70 (1994)
(arguing that while the existence of a MPD remains an open question, proponents
have a better case than the skeptics). Cf Seymour L. Halleck, Dissociative Phenomena
and the Question of Responsibility, 38 INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 298
(1990) (noting that there is considerable controversy about the disorder and
recommending that, in the absence of good objective data, clinical wisdom and
experience suggest treatment aimed at maximizing the responsibility of those
allegedly suffering from MPD).
"judge David Bazelon is the most famous modern exemplar of this position. See
David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385,403 (1976).
189 The purpose of this Section is not to canvass all possible arguments about the
viability of a "rotten social background" excuse, but, rather, simply to determine if
control problems are the best justification for such a defense.
The explanation for the higher rates of severe mental disorder among the
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coercion or a defect of volition or choice excuses. But if depriva-
tion or rotten social background simply produces character flaws or
antisocial predispositions, why should this create more ground for
excuse than any other nonculpable developmental cause of such
flaws or predispositions? Determination or universal causation does
not excuse and many people from more advantageous backgrounds
turn out rotten nevertheless. Finally, a rotten background that
places an agent in environments in which there are fewer opportuni-
ties to fly straight does not satisfyingly create an excusing condition
unless choice is so nonculpably constrained that coercion occurs.
This unfortunate circumstance will rarely arise, however. Even the
most impoverished environments in our society provide enough
opportunities so that few agents can claim, when the balance of evils
is negative, that they meet the moralized criteria for duress or
internal coercion. This is not to deny the existence of criminogenic
environments that exist as a result of inequality and unjust social
laws, institutions, and practices."' One might then claim that it
is unfair to blame and punish offending agents from those environ-
ments. The reason, however, would not be that the agent was
excusable. As noted, there is no defect of volition, irrationality,
external or internal coercion, or any other standard excusing
condition. Rather, the argument would be that such an unjust
society lacks the moral authority to blame and punish those who are
rightly called its victims.
19 2
If deprivation or rotten social background does not satisfy
standard criteria for excuse, what is the basis of the powerful
intuition that deprived agents should be excused? The true basis,
I believe, is sympathy for those who have suffered. 93 Although
socially disadvantaged is elusive. The two dominant hypotheses are social causation
and social selection or drift. The most recent large-scale epidemiological attempt to
resolve the question discovered that social selection may better explain the higher
rates of schizophrenia, but that social causation may better explain depression in
women and antisocial personality and substance abuse in men. See Bruce P.
Dohrenwend et al., Socioeconomic Status and Psychiatric Disorders: The Causation-
Selection Issue, 255 SCIENCE 946 (1992).
191 See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 110-20, on file with author).
19' See Bazelon, supra note 188, at 401-02 (suggesting that the United States is
properly so characterized, and that "it is simply unjust to place people in dehu-
manizing social conditions, to do nothing about those conditions, and then to
command those who suffer, 'Behave-or else!'").
" See Michael Tonry, Racial Disproportion in US Prisons, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY,
Special Issue 1994, at 97, 112 (arguing that social deprivation cannot justify an
affirmative defense, but that it does warrant informal mitigation at all stages of the
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such responses are understandable because sympathy is entirely
appropriate, deprivation is nevertheless not clearly relevant to
responsibility ascriptions, and the proper legal response to the
rational and uncoerced but relevantly deprived criminal is problem-
atic. As Martha Klein has demonstrated, deprivation is arguably
relevant only if it is the cause of the actor's morally reprehensible state
of mind that produced the criminal act.19 4 Klein also suggests that
in such cases the offender deserves less punishment because she
"has paid something in advance" by her previous suffering.
9 5
The payment-in-advance principle has intuitive appeal, but note
that it is not an argument about responsibility. Rather, a fully
responsible miscreant is simply being punished less after the offense
because she has been punished before the offense by the very condi-
tions that produced her culpability. Viewed from the vantage point
of an entire life, the offender has been fully punished, albeit in
large measure by agencies other than the state. There are also
practical problems with this suggestion, such as identifying causal
suffering, calibrating the proper deserved punishment post-offense,
and dealing with the danger to public safety that less-punished,
responsible actors represent. For our purposes, however, the
crucial point is simply that a history of deprivation itself does not
furnish grounds for a control excuse, even when it is causally
relevant to the actor's offense. If the law wishes to consider the
rotten social background of a rational, uncoerced agent, the agent's
lack of control is most decidedly not the reason for doing so.
F. The "New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome"
Mental health professionals, lawyers, law professors, and others
often use the purported identification of new "syndromes" that may
be causally associated with criminal behavior to claim that the
syndrome sufferer should be excused because the sufferer could not
help offending. Battered victims seeking to defend against
homicide or assault charges on an excuse theory, for example, may
employ such claims. 96 The analysis of this Article should demon-
criminal justice process); cf. Boldt, supra note 114, at 2254-85 (providing an
explanation of the law's ambivalence towards deprived offenders, and rejecting an
account of responsibility based solely on unimpaired practical reasoning).
194 
See MARTHA KLEIN, DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION 84-91,
172-76 (1990).
195 Id. at 82.
19 Butsee Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (rejecting
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strate, however, that causation, lack of intention, volitional defect,
and lack of choice are not generally good candidates to support a
control excuse. Once again, let us unpack the possible bases for
excuse not to resolve all the issues concerning the defenses available
to battered women, but rather for the limited purpose of assessing
whether a control theory provides a sound justification for an
excuse.
Consider battered victim syndrome sufferers who kill in
circumstances that would not satisfy the criteria for a self-defense
justification.1 97  The killer's conduct is not excusable simply
because it is caused. Furthermore, surely most kill intentionally: it
is their clear purpose to take the batterer's life. Their volitions
execute this more general intention most effectively. If, on the
other hand, they kill while in a dissociated state, 198 then the
proper analysis is either no action for want of volition, or irrationali-
ty.
Claims by battered victims that they had "no choice" are
metaphorical and moral, not literal. The battered agent clearly
makes a literal choice between at least two options-kill or do not
kill-when she takes the batterer's life. The moral claim is ambigu-
ous, however, and at least four possibilities suggest themselves.
First, the battered victim might be claiming that there were no
genuinely reasonable alternatives to killing the batterer when she
did. If correct, the killing is justified and an excuse is not necessary.
Second, suppose that a reasonable alternative exists, but the
syndrome deprives the sufferer of the ability to recognize either that
it does exist or that she can take advantage of it. An excuse might
then obtain, but it would be based on irrationality. Third, the killer
might claim that the batterer's continued existence caused her such
fear, depression, or other untoward emotional states, that she killed
to end the unbearable dysphoria. This argument appears to be one
both the "battered woman excuse" because it negatively stereotypes women and the
law's theory of responsibility because it fails to accommodate women's experiences);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Spring 1990, at 105, 111-30 (suggesting that the criminal law is "pacific" and should
not encourage private violent solutions to interpersonal conflict).
"" As Holly Maguigan has importantly shown, however, the great majority of
battered women who raise a claim of self-defense attacked their batterers in a
confrontational situation. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths
and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 391-97 (1991).
"' See, e.g., Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Towdrd the
Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 227,235-37 (1986)
(case of Ms. Diaz), reprinted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 873-74.
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of internal coercion, but once again, such claims seem better
analyzed as irrationality problems. Moreover, the dysphoria must
be immense to support an internal coercion claim, because the
harm caused, homicide, is a great evil. Indeed, the common law
would never accept this theory, even if it accepted internal coercion
arguments in general, because duress/coercion does not excuse
homicides. Last, the battered victim might assert that although
alternatives that the law deems reasonable were available, they were
in fact insufficient as a matter of justice. The killer should be
excused because the law of self-defense immorally left her with no
fair choice to defend herself lawfully. Like the argument of the
deprived offender, however, this claim is not about an excusable
agent. Rather, it is addressed to the morality of the law itself.
In sum, battered victims who strike back should on proper
occasions be justified or excused, but not because they were out-of-
control agents.
V. ASSESSING AND ADJUDICATING CONTROL EXCUSES
Previous Parts of this Article have argued that control excuses
are best understood as irrationality or internal coercion claims, and
that the latter often reduce to irrationality claims themselves. This
Part examines how to assess claims of lack of control to permit
finders of fact to decide whether the agent is responsible.
1 99
Because the law is concerned with whether the agent was
irrational or internally coerced, the fundamental inquiry in all cases
concerns the out-of-control agent's psychological phenomenology-
what were the agent's thoughts and feelings. Needless to say, we
cannot directly "read" each others' minds or measure the strength
of desires or feelings. Nevertheless, most people are quite expert
at identifying and assessing other agents' reasons for action.
Relatively orderly and predictable human interaction is possible only
because we are all able within reasonable limits to make inferences
about our fellow humans' mental states from behavior, including
199 The analysis and recommendations reached in this Part are entirely consistent
with the fuller argument and conclusions of earlier articles. See Stephen J. Morse,
Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 527, 600-26 (1978); Morse, supra note 138, at 983-1018. But see Bonnie &
Slobogin, supra note 138, at 433-35. Although Professor Bonnie still adheres to the
general arguments of his article, he has come to reject a "volitional" test for legal
insanity, in part for reasons similar to those given in my earlier articles and in the
present section of this Article. See Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity
Defense, 69 A.B.A.J. 194, 196 (1983).
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speech acts. Moreover, assessing the rationality of another person's
reasons for action requires only that we identify those reasons and
then evaluate them according to our operative, normative theory of
rationality. Of course, how much irrationality is required to justify
excusing is a moral and legal matter.
In contrast, judging the strength of another's desires and
dysphoria, or fear of it, is a herculean endeavor. Unlike rationality
cases, there are no relatively clear phenomena to match against a
roughly consensual normative standard. Indeed, this is a major
difficulty with the empirical model of internal coercion: famously,
we cannot distinguish between irresistible impulses and those
impulses simply not resisted. No established metric exists to
determine the magnitude of impulses, desires, or feelings. That two
independent observers trained in the same system of assessment
would agree that a subject exhibits desires of a certain strength or
is unable to refrain from acting does not entail that the system is
valid, and I know of no such measurement system with established
validity."' Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the strength of
desires, the strength of temptations, and the capacity for self-
control. There have been numerous studies of impulsiveness and
self-control in the psychological and psychiatric literature,20 1 and
people do commonsensically note individual differences in these
traits. Moreover, we talk about impulses, the will, and self-control
as if these are independent psychological entities that are well-
understood and reliably identifiable. But theoretical disarray
abounds in psychology; the studies often contradict each other;
measures of supposedly the same variable correlate poorly; findings
are often based on suspect self-reports; and, most importantly, the
studies do not address, and folk psychology does not know, whether
and to what degree people are unable to refrain from acting.
20 2
Neither in psychology, philosophy, nor folk psychology is there a
reasonably uncontroversial understanding of these matters. Finally,
200 Rogers's system, see supra note 110, which is discussed further in this Section,
is primarily about rationality and is unvalidated.
20" See, e.g., Ernest S. Barrat, Impulsiveness and Aggressiveness, in VIOLENCE AND
MENTAL DISORDER, supra note 133, at 61; Ernest S. Barrat &Jim H. Patton, Impulsivi-
ty: Cognitive Behaviora and Psychophysiological Correlates, in BIOLOGICAL BASES OF
SENSATION SEEKING, IMPULSIVITY, AND ANXIETY 77 (Marvin Zuckerman ed., 1983);
Dickman, supra note 46, at 95; A.W. Logue, Research on Self-Control: An Integrating
Framework, 11 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN Sci. 665 (1988).202 See generally THE IMPULSIVE CLIENT, supra note 40. Especially useful for
considering the points raised in the text are Dickman, supra note 44, at 151, and
McCown & DeSimone, supra note 41, at 3.
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we do not know how mental disorder affects self-control in general,
apart from its more clear role in affecting perception and belief,
which are variables central to rationality.
The strongest contrary claims in the literature fail both
conceptually and empirically. For example, in an article about legal
insanity that purports to demonstrate that volitional problems can
be reliably identified, Rogers provides "Representative Criteria for
Assessing Volitional Capacity."2 M3 But inspection of the criteria
Rogers proposes discloses that they are firmly in the camp of folk
psychology, and most do not describe failures of volition or the will-
which is anyway never defined. Rather, they are criteria of
irrationality in the face of strong desires, emotions, impulses, and
the like. For instance, Rogers's criteria ask: "What did the defen-
dant perceive as his or her alternatives to the criminal behavior?" or
"Did the criminal behavior include planning or preparation?"
20 4
One criterion begs the question by asking, "Was the loss of control
caused by a strong emotional state (for example, rage reaction) or
intoxication, or both?"2 5 None of these criteria individually nor
all of them taken together can demonstrate with acceptable
scientific precision whether and to what degree a defendant lacked
the capacity to behave lawfully under the circumstances. And
virtually all are designed to uncover rationality defects rather than
defects of volition. And, in a later article using only four forensic
psychiatrists as subjects, Rogers and colleagues claim that they
empirically establish that volitional criteria are practically important
and logically distinct from cognitive criteria. 2 6  But the article
shows only that the tiny number of subjects believe that they can
distinguish and use volitional criteria. No evidence in the study
demonstrates that the subjects in fact used volitional criteria that
are independent of rationality, and nothing in the study, contrary
to its blithe assurance, supports the conceptual validity of indepen-
dent volitional problems.
Proponents of an independent coercion or volitional excuse
often try to justify its adoption in the face of conceptual and
assessment problems by correctly arguing that our understanding of
the causes of cognitive or rationality defects is as primitive as the
203 Rogers, supra note 110, app. A at 848.
204 Id.
210 Id. (emphasis added).
206 See Robert M. Wettstein et al., A Prospective Comparison of Four Insanity Defense
Standards, 148 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 21 (1991).
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understanding of the etiology of inner coercion. Although true, this
argument is irrelevant to the differential difficulty of assessing
existing irrationality and inner coercion. The law's concern is not
why glitches occur. Rather, to evaluate responsibility the law needs
to know only whether and to what degree glitches do occur. Under-
standing the causal background may in some cases be probative
about whether an excusing condition exists, but no particular cause
is required to justify the excusing condition.17 For example, if we
are convinced that a person was in the throes of nonculpable
irrationality, we excuse the agent, even if we do not know what
produced the abnormality. The causes of cognitive and volitional
defects are equally obscure, but for the reasons suggested above, we
can empirically identify and normatively assess each others' reasons
for action far better than we can identify and assess each others'
strength of desire or intensity of feeling. Although there are no
conclusive studies that prove this point, I believe that the opposite
claim is so counterintuitive that it is fair to place the burden of
persuasion on those who disagree.
Ultimately, internal coercion assessment may collapse into
rationality assessment. Virtually all cases of so-called irresistible
impulse will prove on close analysis to be instances of irrationality,
especially if the law continues to require that an abnormality is
required. Even the commonsense basis for judging control
problems is often a disguised rationality criterion. For example, the
"policeman at the elbow" test, which is usually understood as a
volitional standard, is, I think, better interpreted as a rationality
test. Those who offend in the face of certain capture have either
rationally decided for political or other reasons that the offense is
worth the punishment, as in cases of civil disobedience, or they are
irrational. We generally tend to conclude that intense internal
coercion was operative if conduct was so irrational that we cannot
make any sense of it; otherwise, why would the person do it? Again,
however, rationality is the real issue.
Still assuming, however, that cases of pure internal coercion
exist, the best we can do is gather evidence about the defendant's
conduct in a wide variety of circumstances that should constrain
control difficulties, ask the actor to tell us how she felt, and observe
207 One may object that we must identify causes such as mental disorder, but the
same evidence that proves the presence of mental disorder also proves the substantive
part of an irrationality test. Moreover, there is no need to identify the cause of the
mental disorder.
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psychophysical signs, such as trembling or perspiring, that may also
provide a clue. The moral test asks only for phenomenological
description and then weighs it in the moral balance. By comparing
the intensity of the threatened dysphoria to the conduct chosen to
avoid it, we can make the moral and legal decision whether an
internal coercion excuse is warranted. This we can try to do
without kidding ourselves by treating the pseudoscientific enterprise
of assessing so-called volitional problems as if it were an achievable
inquiry based on empirically valid techniques. 20 8  Even when
performed rationally, however, assessments of internal coercion are
a dicey proposition at best. On both theoretical and practical
grounds, the law should (and does) treat internal coercion claims
with great caution.
CONCLUSION: THE MORAL OF THE STORY
The moral of the story is simple: claims about lack of control
are far more complicated than most claimants recognize. Often the
claim is an ideologically motivated but unanalyzed assertion that this
defendant should be excused. On many occasions the defendant
should be excused because she was irrational, internally coerced,
failed to act, or, more controversially, lacked some other attribute,
such as the capacities for empathy and guilt, that make it hard to fly
straight and thus should be included in ajust account of responsibil-
ity. Recognizing the complexity will help lawyers and the legal
system fly straight themselves, because it will irresistibly compel
them to define in detail, and justify more fully, those criteria that
genuinely should excuse.
208 See generally Seymour L. Halleck, Clinical Assessment on the Voluntariness of
Behavior, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSCYCHIATRY & L. 221, 226-34 (recognizing that
clinicians "rarely have access to conceptual or practical guidelines for assessing
involuntariness," and failing to provide explicit criteria for involuntariness, but
offering "factors" to be considered in assessing involuntariness).
